LORD LINGARAJ BUE BHUBANESWAR Vs. NITYANANDA MISHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against order passed by the High court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction quashing the order passed by the Commissioner of Endowments under Section 25 of the orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

(2.) Facts in brief are that the land, originally, belonged to Lord Lingaraj, the appellant. It was let out in 1937 before coming into force of the Act by the Trust Board, in favour of'one Dr Ramendu Ray. The land was agricultural wasteland which was reclaimed by Dr Ray and he continued in possession till his death. After his death his widow Bhibhati succeeded to the estate and paid rent to the Board. In 1970 an application was filed on behalf of the appellant under Section 68 of the Act for recovery of possession. It was allowed. The order was, however, set aside by the Commissioner on 7/5/1971 and it was held that she became occupancy tenant. She appears to have transferred the land in dispute in favour of respondents. They approached the Tahsildar under S. 6 and 7 of the orissa Estates Abolition Act (referred as "abolition Act") for being regarded as occupancy tenant. The application was rejected. In further appeal it was held that their application was not maintainable as provisions of S. 6 and 7 could be invoked only by a person with whom land has been settled as intermediate. The appellant thereafter filed another application under Section 25 of the Act for recovery of the property. It was alleged that after the enforcement of Abolition Act, land was settled with the intermediary that is, the appellant who leased it out to Bhibhati who alienated it in favour of the respondent in contravention of Section 19 of the Act, therefore, the respondents were liable to ejectment. The application was allowed. The order was challenged by way of a writ petition in the High court. The High court did not examine the question whether the proceedings under S. 6 and 7 of the Abolition Act were inaccordance with law and whether the procedure provided under Section 8-A was observed. The High court felt that although different aspects of the case had not been examined and it would have been advisable to remand the matter to the Commissioner but the litigation having gone on for number of years and the claim of the respondent having been firmly established it was not necessary to prolong it further. The High court held that the lease was given in favour of Dr Ray even before the orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939 had come into force. It was further held that in the earlier proceedings for eviction initiated by the appellant under Section 68 of the Act it was clearly held that Dr Ray and after him his widow had acquired occupancy tenancy rights and this decision having become final as the appellant did not challenge it, the possession of Bhibhati was not unauthorised and she having been an occupancy tenant the entire proceedings by which the land was settled with appellant as intermediary was contrary to law.

(3.) Section 25 of the Act permits the trustee to file an application against a person who was otherwise in unauthorised occupation. The application filed by the appellant, therefore, was maintainable. But the respondent was not precluded in these proceedings from claiming that he had acquired rights and he was not in unauthorised occupation. It was also open to him to claim that his predecessor had a better title than the appellant and, therefore, no order under Section 25 could have been passed. It is not necessary to say anything further as even though the High court has held the earlier order passed by the Commissioner under Section 68 to be res judicata and the appellant is claiming that the respondents' predecessor-in-interest lost her right and title once Abolition Act was enforced and the property was settled with the appellant under notification issued in 1974 under Section 7 of the Abolition Act, as the proceedings under Section 25 of the Act for eviction of the respondent are summary in nature. That is clear from Ss. (3 of Section 25 which permits an aggrieved party to approach the civil court. Shri Sachar, learned Senior Counsel, however, vehemently argued that in view of the provisions in Abolition Act no suit could be filed in the civil court as these matters were covered by Ch. II of the Abolition Act. On the other hand Shri Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent urged that the remand to the Commissioner would be delaying the matter as in view of the provisions of Ss. (3 of Section 25 the aggrieved party would still have a remedy to go to the civil court. He, therefore, urged that the litigation having gone for quite long it was appropriate and expedient either to direct the civil court to decide the dispute or to dismiss the appeal and direct the appellant to approach the appropriate court if he was aggrieved by the order.