STATE OF BIHAR Vs. DHIRENDRA KUMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted.

(2.) This appeal by special leave arises from the judgement and order dated 7th Feb., 1986 passed by the Patna High Court at Patna in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 16 of 1986. A notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 1/94 (for short, 'the Act') was published on Feb. 13, 1957 acquiring the disputed land along with other lands for public purpose, namely construction of the houses by the Housing Board, known as the Peoples Co-operative House Construction Society Ltd., Patna. The declaration under Sec. 6 was published on March 27, 1957. The possession of the and was taken on March 22, 1957 and the same was given to the Housing board on the same day. It would appear that several encroachments have been made in the land and unauthorised constructions appear to have been made. Steps were taken by the Housing Board to have the encroachers ejected from those lands. As sequel thereof, it would appear that the respondent laid Title Suit No. 329/85 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge-I at Patna and filed an interlocutory application under Order 39, Rule 1 of C.P.C for ad interim injunction. The Subordinate Judge in his order dated 18th Oct., 1985 found prima facie case with triable issue. Accordingly, injunction was issued, restraining the appellants from dispossessing the respondent till the disposal of the suit without causing any disturbance to the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the suit or demolition of any structure standing thereon. On appeal, it was modified by the High Court, holding that the status quo as on Oct. 18, shall be maintained. Thus these appeals by special leave.

(3.) The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether interim induction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Sec. 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Sec. 4 and Sec. 6 of the Act by proper publication and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Acts as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Sec. 6, of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended be Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Sec. 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Sec. 11-A, now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years of date of publication envisaged under Sec. 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Govt. needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under Sec. 1794) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under Sec. 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Sec. 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise it would take possession after the award under Sec. 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil Court to take cognizance of the case under Sec. 9 of C.P.C. stands excluded, and a civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Sec. 4, and declaration under Sec. 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial Court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction.