(1.) We do not find any justification warranting interference in this matter. Admittedly, notification under Section 4 (1 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, 'the Act') was published on 29/1/1957 and thereafter the owner sold the properties to the petitioners on 11/6/1957 and 22/8/1958. Declaration under Section 6 was published on 14/8/1958. Thus, it could be seen that the sales made after the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1 are void sales and the State is not bound by such a sale effected by the owner. Admittedly, the notice under S. 9 and 10 was served on 23/9/1958 and award was made on 9/10/1959 and possession was taken on 18/11/1959. Thus, the acquisition was complete. The possession of the government is complete as against the original owner and title of the original owner stood extinguished and by operation of Section 16 the State acquires the right, title and interest in the property free from all encumbrances. So any encumbrance made by the owner after notification under Section 4 (1 was published does not bind the State. Possession would be taken through the usual mode of drafting a panchnama by the officer and signed by the witness. It is complete and conclusive. Thereby it is clear, as found by the court below that possession was taken as a fact and handed over to the third respondent-society. Therefore, the Society became the absolute owner of the acquired lands free from all encumbrances. The claim of the petitioners that they have perfected title by adverse possession was negatived by all the courts. No question of adverse possession arises unless it is pleaded and proved that after the possession was taken and handed over to the third respondent, the petitioners have asserted their own right to the knowledge of the third respondent and it had acquiesced in it and remained in uninterruptedpossession and enjoyment, nec vi,nec lam and nec pre carlo. That was not the case. Therefore, they cannot have any semblance of right by prescription. It is rather unfortunate that the State filed a suit for possession. They should have resorted to summary eviction under the Public Premises Act etc. ; instead they have gone to the civil court. All the courts granted decree in favour of the government and the Society. We do not find any ground warranting interference with judgment and decree in SAs Nos. 146, 147 and 150 of 1982 dated 11/10/1994 of Bombay High court at Nagpur bench.
(2.) The Special Leave Petitions are accordingly dismissed.