TEJA SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals are disposed of by a common judgment since a common question of law has arisen in these appeals. The material facts in C.A . Nos. 202-03/91 need be noted for disposal of these appeals, which are as under:

(2.) The Improvement Trust, Ludhiana had framed as scheme called 'Development-cum-Housing Accommodation Scheme' on the right side of Pakhowal road beyond Sidhawan Canal at Ludhiana which was approved by Resolution No.28 dated March 24, 1976. After following the procedure prescribed under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for short 'the Act') the approval of the State Government under S.41 of the Act was sought for and granted by the State on June 28, 1979. The appellants and some others questioned the correctness of the aforesaid scheme in Sunder Singh v. State of Punjab (W.P. No.3056/82). By judgment dated Feb.9, 1984, the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, on concession made by the counsel appearing for the State, quashed the scheme qua the petitioners therein. The appellants had also sought to quash the scheme on the grounds that the scheme sanctioned by the Government was different from the scheme framed by the Trust; the notices as required under Ss.36 and 38 have not been served; there was inordinate delay in finalisation of the scheme and that, therefore the entire scheme required to be quashed. All the contentions were negatived by the High Court. On the effect of the decision of Sunder Singhs' case, the Division Bench pointed out that since the decision was on the concession made by the State counsel that the scheme was not approved within three years from the date of the publication of the Notification under S.36, which legally and factually was not correct, the ratio therein does not bind the respondents. Thus the Writ Petition No.3124/81 came to be dismissed by the High Court in the impugned order dated March 1, 1979. Similar are the facts in other appeals.

(3.) Shri O.P.Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, while reiterating the first two contentions raised in the High Court, strenuously contended that notice served on one of the co-owners was not a service of notice on all the owners. Admittedly notices on other three owners were not served. Their brother was not on speaking terms with the appellants. Section 36 and 38 speak of personal notice to the owner or occupier. The omission to serve on all the co-owners renders the entire scheme void and inoperative. These contentions have been resisted by the learned counsel for the respondents.