KARNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST KARNAL Vs. PARKASH WANTI DEAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals by special leave arise from the judgments of the High court of Punjab and Haryana in LPA No. 1042 of 1990 and batch dated 29/4/1991. The facts lie in a short compass for deciding the question of law arising for adjudication in these appeals. The appellant framed Scheme No. 37 to improve the existing roads and development of the area in Old Sabzi Mandi, Karnal, and for that purpose a resolution under Section 36 of the Punjab Improvement Trusts Act, 1922 , (for short "the Act") was passed by the Trust and published on 7/9/1993. After its sanction by the State government, notification under Section 45 was published. The Land Acquisition Collector in his award dated 24/5/1976,granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 100. 00 per sq. yd. Dissatisfied therewith, the respondents and others sought reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the tribunal constituted in that behalf under the Act. The President of the tribunal in his awards dated 18/11/1988 etc. enhanced the compensation in some case to Rs. 1,396. 00 per sq. yd. and in some other case to Rs. 450. 00 per sq. yd. etc. Dissatisfied therewith, the appellant as well as the respondents filed writ petitions under Article 226 in the High court. The Single Judge as also the division bench, granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,396. 00 uniformly to all the claimants. Thus these appeals.

(2.) Shri Verma, learned counsel appearing for the Trust, raised five-fold contentions. The main thrust is the validity of the award made by the President of the tribunal. Besides, he also challenged the correctness of the amendment of the writ petition claiming enhanced compensation allowed by the High court; omission to deduct developmental charges; taking irrelevant sale deeds into consideration; omission to consider two relevant sale deeds; and lastly the errors in calculation of the compensation. The counsel for the respondents and some of the parties in person resisted the contentions of the appellants. We have heard both sides primarily on the first question and, therefore, the appellant had not addressed us in full on other points, though respondent sought to support the award on merits. The question is whether the Chairman alone can pass the award under the Act. If the finding would be in favour of the validity, then only the need to go into the other questions would arise. The division bench, following the ratio in Sohan Lal v. State of Haryana and on the doctrine of acquiescence, upheld the validity of the award.

(3.) In Sohan Lal case the High court in coming to its conclusion that the President alone could make the award under the Act, reasoned that the President holds pivotal position having administrative and judicial experience with the qualifications of eligibility for appointment as a Judge of Punjab and Haryana High court. He presides over the proceedings. He has power to summon the witnesses, compel the production of documents; he is a Judge under the Act; he holds the proceedings as a civil court; he has administrative control over the staff; he has the exclusive power to decide questions of law and title and procedure on which the opinion of the President is final. The assessors are ancillary and practically they are not members of the tribunal stricto sensu. No qualifications have been prescribed as eligibility for their appointment as assessors. No quorum has been prescribed. They need to hold no previous experience either judicial or administrative. Their attending the enquiry is optional and in the event of their being present and participation their dissent may be relevant. The operation of the statute must be so construed as to avoid inconvenience and hardship to the litigant public.