KAKA SINGH Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal under Section 16, of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as TADA) is directed against the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the learned Judge, Designated Court, Karnal, by his order dated August 19, 1987 in Sessions Trial No. 33 of 1987. It appears that the accused was apprehended by the police on October 8, 1985 at about 2.00 P.M. and according to the prosecution case on search of his person, a country made pistol and four live cartridges without any permit or licence were recovered from the possession of the accused. The prosecution case was sought to be established by examining Constable Maha Singh (P. W. 3) and Head Constable Narain Das (P. W. 3). The accused appellants, however, stated that he was falsely implicated at the instance of his uncle Santa Singh. In support of such contention he examined witness Amir Chand (D. W. 1), which has been rightly discarded by the learned Judge, Designated Court by indicating that the accused attempted to make the case doubtful but defence case could not be established by the said witness. Accepting the evidence given by the said two police personnel, the learned Judge came to the finding that the accused unauthorisedly possessed the said country made pistol. Hence, he was held guilty of the offence under Section 25, of the Arms Act and Section 6(1), of the TADA. Since the cartridges alleged to have been seized from the person of the accused could not be produced in Court, the case of recovery of such cartridges was not accepted by the learned Judge. Considering the young age of the appellant and also considering the fact that excepting the said possession of a country made pistol no other terrorist activities were attributed to the accused, the learned Judge sentenced the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year.

(2.) The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has, however, contended that as the appellant was apprehended from a public thoroughfare, it was quite likely that members of the public were present but in the instant case no independent member from the public had been examined by the prosecution. He has also submitted that about the time of the arrest of the appellant there is discrepancy in the depositions of P. Ws 2 and 3 inasmuch as one of the witnesses had stated that the appellant was apprehended at 1.00 P. M., other has stated at 3.00 P. M. We may indicate here that after the arrest of the accused a rukka was sent at about 2.00 P. M. and the learned Judge has rightly indicated that the time of arrest as 3.00 P. M. was stated by one of the witnesses under some confusion because the time of sending the rukka was also stated by the said witness as 2.00 P. M. We do not find any material discrepancy in the depositions of the said police personnel for which the prosecution case becomes doubtful. There was no suggestion given to the witnesses examined by the prosecution that at the relevant time, the members of the public were present at the spot. Since it was a case of sudden apprehension without any pre-plan, we do not think that non-examination of any independent public witness was essential in the facts of the case.

(3.) In the facts of the case, we do not think that the conviction of the appellant is unjustified. Hence no interference is called for against the conviction. It, however, appears to us that the incident had taken place in the month of October, 1985 and the appellant was found in possession of a country made pistol and the learned Judge has also noted that excepting such possession, there was no allegation of any terrorist activities being resorted to by the appellant. It appears to us that the appellant has also served for more than seven months of imprisonment and he has been released on bail by this Court's order dated March 22, 1988 and has been settled in family life.