SURESH Vs. IMRAN KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We have heard counsel at some length and while we had initially issued a notice since inter alia the question in regard to interpretation of Article 215 of the Constitution read with or without Section 20 of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971 was projected, we find that the present proceedings can be closed on a very limited point without going into the aforesaid wider question. From the facts of the case it is not in dispute that the injunction order was not served on the litigant but was served on his lawyer. There is no material on record to show that the lawyer communicated that order by which he was restrained from proceeding with the construction to the litigant. Unaware of any such order if the litigant proceeded with the construction can it be said that he was guilty of committing contempt of the court's order The answer must be in the negative for obvious reasons.

(2.) The proceedings in contempt are in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings and it must be shown that the litigant in defiance or disobedience of the court's order proceeded to do any act which was in violation thereof. Unless the litigant is aware of a prohibitory order made against him by the court there can be no desire or intention on his part to flout the court's order. Therefore, unless it is shown that the litigant was made aware of the order served on his lawyer it may not be possible to hold that despite the knowledge of the order he wilfully decided to commit a breach of the order by acting contrary thereto. Proceedings in the nature of contempt being quasi-criminal it must be shown that the litigant was aware of the prohibitory order issued by the court and notwithstanding the same in breach thereof or in total disregard thereof he proceeded to continue with the construction. It being not disputed that there was no evidence to show that the lawyer to whom the prohibitory order was given had communicated that order in any manner whatsoever to the litigant, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that by continuing with the construction the litigant intended to commit a breach of the order or showed disrespect for the order. In that view of the matter if the High court was disinclined to punish the litigant for contempt, be that under the Contempt of courts Act, 1971 or under article 215 of the Constitution of India, we see no reason why we should interfere with the impugned order in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed. No order on the application for impleadment.