ABDUL AZIZ Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this application under Article 32 of the Constitution the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter to be referred to as the TADA Act), particularly the provisions of Section 1(4) of the Act are sought to be challenged mainly on the ground that the Act having expired the provisions for continuing the trial under the said Act is illegal and it has been contended that this provision violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

(2.) Mr. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing in support of the application, has submitted that in the Constitution Bench decision rendered in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 the constitutional validity of Section 1(4) has not been specifically gone into but consideration of such question has become important because the trial has been allowed to continue even after the lapse of the said Act. In support of his contention a reference has been made to the decision of this Court in Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, (1959) 2 Suppl. SCR 87. We may only indicate that in Gopi Chand's case this Court specifically noted that in the absence of the saving clause in the Act the trial which may commence for the offences under the said Act, would not be held valid thereafter. But in the instant case, Specific saving clause has been provided in the Act itself (TADA Act). As such, the decision in Gopi Chand's case does not apply in the facts of this case.

(3.) We may only indicate here that in the majority decision in Kartar Singh's case (supra) it has been indicated that if the procedural law is oppressive and violates the principles of just and fair trial offending Article 21 of the Constitution and is discriminatory violating Article 14 of the Constitution, then Section 15 of the TADA Act is to be struck down. As a distinction has been made in TADA Act, grouping the Terrorists and disruptionists as a separate class of offenders from ordinary criminals under the normal laws and the classification of the offences under the TADA Act as aggravated form of crimes distinguishable from the ordinary crimes, it has to be tested and determined as to whether this distinction and classification are reasonable and valid within the term of Article 14. Hence, it is essential to examine the classification of 'offenders' and 'offences' so as to decide whether Section 15 is violative of Article 14. Viewed from this aspect, the majority decision has upheld the vires of the said Section. We may also indicate here that although Section 1(4) was not specially taken into consideration, the TADA Act was generally held intra vires in Kartar Singh's case (supra).