MOHANLAL Vs. KARTAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal, under certificate granted under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution, by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, is against its decision in LPA No. 366 of 1969.

(2.) Nahar Singh, original plaintiff and father of the respondents, on 18-5-1964, filed a suit in the court of sub-Judge, Dhuri for possession of the suit land, on the basis of ownership of the land and also on the ground that the order of eviction passed against him by the Collector under Section 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on 12-5-62 was void and ineffective. His case was that he has purchased the suit land from Sharif Hussain on 24-2-1955. At that time Mohan Lal, original defendant and appellant in this appeal, was in occupation of that land as a tenant. Mohan Lal continued to hold that land as his tenant after the sale. Sometime in June 1955, he approached the Village Panchayat as Mohan Lal had not given his share in the produce. On 16-6-1955 a compromise was arrived at between him and Mohan Lal whereunder Mohan Lal had agreed to relinquish possession of the land as he was not able to pay the rent and on his part he had agreed not to recover his share/rent. Pursuant to the compromise the Panchayat also passed a resolution to that effect and Mohan Lal willingly handed over possession of the land to him. On 21st June, 1955 i.e. with in 5 days of the compromise Mohan Lai approached the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of that area and alleged that he was forcibly dispossessed and claimed restoration of possession under Section 43 of the Act. The Sub Divisional Magistrate rejected that application as an application under Section 43 could be made to the Collector and not to him. Soon after the SDM was invested with that power Mohan Lal again applied to him. On 12-5-1962 the SDM allowed that application and passed an order for his eviction. Mohan Lal got back possession of the land under that order on 25th May, 1962. He filed an appeal to the Commissioner. It was dismissed. His revision application to the Financial Commissioner was also rejected. He then filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court and that was also dismissed. It was also his plea that as the order passed by the SDM was without jurisdiction and, therefore void ab initio, earlier proceedings under the Act were no bar to his filing the suit.

(3.) The learned Civil Judge believed the version of the plaintiff that Mohan Lal had voluntarily surrendered his possession and, therefore, held that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties had come to an end and for that reason the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction under Section 43 of the Act. He decreed the suit. Mohan Lal filed an appeal to the District Court but it failed. He then filed a second appeal in the High Court. It was not disputed before the learned single Judge who heard that appeal that if Mohan Lal had been forcibly dispossessed by Nahar Singh on 16-6-1955, then Nahar Singh would be a person in wrongful or unauthorised possession of the land, to the use and occupation of which he would not be entitled under the provisions of the Act. In view of the rival contentions, what the learned Judge was required to decide was "whether the dispute about the manner in which the respondent obtained possession of the land from the appellant on 16th June, 1953, was to be decided by the Collector or by the Civil Court". The contention raised on behalf of Nahar Singh was that the dispute before the Court was not a matter covered by Section 47, and that before the Collector could assume jurisdiction, the facts covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 43 should have been either admitted or established in a Civil Court and that the Collector did not have jurisdiction under Section 43 to adjudicate upon matters relating to status or title over the land. The learned single Judge after considering the beneficent object of the Act and its material provisions held that those provisions should be liberally construed. He also held that the Act is a complete Code in itself and provides for a complete machinery for decision of a dispute like the one which was before him. He further held that it was open to the Collector while dealing with an application under Section 43 of the Act to go into the disputed questions like whether the dispossession of the tenant was illegal and whether the compromise was entered into by the tenant voluntarily or under duress. He further held that the language used in Section 43 shows that the legislature by necessary intendment, if not expressly, has given to the Collector the power to enquire not only into the question whether the person concerned is liable to be ejected on the basis of certain facts admitted or already proved before the Civil Court but also into the existence of those facts. In other words, he held that it was open to the Collector to decide the disputed question namely whether the compromise pleaded by the land owner was entered into voluntarily or under duress and as he found on enquiry that the compromise was arrived at under duress and, therefore, possession of the land owner was unlawful, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in respect of that matter, by virtue of Section 47 of the Act. He, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit.