SAKURU Vs. TANAJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this appeal filed by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment dated April 12, 1978 of a learned single Judge of the High Court, of Andhra Pradesh, the sole question arising for decision is whether the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked for condoning the delay in the filing of an appeal before the Collector under S. 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 -Act 21 of 1950 (hereinafter called 'the Act').

(2.) The facts which have led up to the present controversy may now be briefly set out. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad declared the respondent-Tanaji to be the owner of an extent of 6 acres, 39 guntas comprised in Survey Nos. 289 and 290 of Hasnapur village under S. 38-E of the Act on the ground that he (the respondent) was a "protected tenant" Though an appeal lay to the Collector under S. 90 of the Act against the said order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer the appellant land holder did not prefer an appeal but, instead, filed a Writ Petition - W. P. No. 2064 of 1976 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the legality and correctness of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. That Writ Petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the High Court on July 1, 1976. Writ Appeal No. 385 of 1976 filed against the decision of the learned single Judge was subsequently dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on December 6, 1976. Long thereafter, on August 22, 1978, the appellant preferred an appeal before the District Collector purporting to be one filed against the order dated January 22,1975 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer together with an application for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. That application and the appeal were opposed by the respondent herein. But his objections were overruled, the delay was condoned and the appeal was allowed by the Collector on October, 24, 1977. The respondent-Tanaji thereupon moved the High Court by filing a revision petition under S. 91 of the Act. By the judgment impugned in this appeal, the learned single Judge of the High Court allowed that revision petition holding that the Collector had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal by invoking S. 5 of the Limitation Act following an earlier ruling of a Division Beach of the same High Court reported in K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao AIR 1978 Andh Pra 166. In that decision the Division Bench of the High Court had taken the view that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings before a Civil or Criminal Court and since the Collector before whom an appeal is filed under S. 90 of the Act, is not a Civil or Criminal Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the proceedings before him unless there is express provision in the special enactment whereunder the Collector is exercising appellate jurisdiction, making any particular section of the Limitation Act specifically applicable to such proceedings. It was further held by the Division Bench that S. 93 of the Act, as it then stood, made, applicable to proceedings before the Collector only those provisions of the limitation Act which related to the computation of the period of limitation and since S. 5 did not fall within the group of sections (Sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act) dealing with computation of the period of limitation, the provisions of S. 5 were not applicable to the proceedings before the Collector. The learned counsel for the appellant has canvassed before us the correctness of the view so taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah's case.

(3.) After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah's case is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (1970) 1 SCR 51, Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corpn. of India (1970) 1 SCR 396 and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad (1976) 2 SCR 845 that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in "Courts" and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified. powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under S. 90 of the Act not being a Court, the Limitation Act, as such, hid no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal, The only provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is S. 93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms:-