BHAG SINGH Vs. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave raises a short but interesting question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 30, sub-section (2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act). There are divergent views expressed by different Benches of this Court in regard to the interpretation of this provision and hence it is necessary to examine this question afresh, in order to arrive. at a proper interpretation, particularly since the interpretation placed by us will affect the determination of compensation in a large number of cases.

(2.) The facts giving rise to this appeal are few, and may be briefly stated as follows. On 19th October, 1974 a notification was issued by the State of Punjab under Section 4, of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) stating that a large chunk of land admeasuring 10768 Bighas 18 Biswas was likely to be needed for the purpose of establishment of a cantonment within the revenue estate of Bhatinda. This notification was followed by another notification issued by the State of Punjab under section 6 of the Act declaring that the entire area admeasuring 10768 Bighas 18 Biswas was needed for the establishment of a cantonment. The Land Acquisition Collector thereafter issued a notice under section 9 of the Act and required persons interested in the land forming the subject matter of the declaration to submit their claims for compensation for acquisition of their interest in the land. The claims submitted by various claimants including the appellants in the present appeal were considered by the Land Acquisition Collector and he made an award on 9th October, 1975 dividing the land acquired into three belts and awarding compensation at varying rates according to the belt in which a particular piece of land was, situated. The appellants and other claimants being aggrieved by the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector, sought references under section 18 of the Act and the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda, hearing the references, amalgamated belts 2, and 3 and enhanced the rates of compensation for the two belts. The appellants and the other claimants were still dissatisfied with the award made by the Additional District Judge and they thereupon preferred appeals to the High Court. On appeal, the learned single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amount of compensation by awarding the rate of Rs, 72,600/- per acre for the first belt and Rs. 25000/- per acre for the second belt and in addition, directed that the claimants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum and solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensation. This order awarding enhanced compensation was however, made subject to the claims put forward in the memoranda of appeal preferred by the claimants and the court-fee paid on such claims. It seems that the appellants had not paid the requisite court-fee on the enhanced amount of compensation and they, therefore, could not get the benefit of the order of the learned, single Judge. They accordingly preferred a letters patent appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court and the other claimants also being dissatisfied with the order made by the learned single Judge preferred letters patent appeals to the Division Bench. The Division Bench of the High Court by an order dated 8th December, 1982 affirmed the judgment of the learned single Judge in regard to the rate of compensation for the land situate in first belt but so far as the lands stuate in the second belt was concerned it enhanced the rate of compensation Rs. 38,720/ per acre. The Division Bench, however, restricted the benefit of the enhanced compensation only to those claimants who had made payment of proper court-fee. The. result was that the letters patent appeal of the appellants was dismissed, though according to the view taken by the Division Bench the appellants were entitled to the enhanced amount of compensation for acquisition of their land. The appellants thereupon preferred the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.

(3.) We are of the view that when the learned single Judge and the Division Bench took the view that the claimants whose land was acquired by the State of. Punjab under the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were entitled to enhanced compensation and the case of the appellants stood on the same footing, the appellants should have been given an opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee so that, like other claimants, they could also get enhanced compensation at the same rate as the others. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench should not have, in our opinion, adopted a technical approach and denied the benefit of enhanced compensation to the appellants merely because they had not initially paid the proper amount of court-fee. It must be remembered that this was not a dispute between two private citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed though even in such a case there may be situations where an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant as for instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here was a claim made by the appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of the land acquired and if according to the judgments of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of the market value so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants would be tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire. the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value. There may be cases where, as for instance, under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice, with a view to eliminating concentration of land in the hands of a few and bringing about its equitable distribution, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the present case, the Division Bench as well as the learned single Judge should have allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit court-fee and awarded to them compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by them.