(1.) The issue involved in this appeal by special leave is:Whether the service of notice under sub-s. (2) of S. 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 ('Act' for short) served on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur was an integral part of the cause of action and was sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of a notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under S. 52(1) of the Act for the acquisition of certain lands belonging to them required by the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur for a public purpose, namely, for implementation of a development scheme viz. Civil Lines Extension Scheme.
(2.) It is somewhat strange that a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court (R. N. Pyne, J.) should have by his order dated March 13, 1984 entertained a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondents, issued a rule nisi thereon requiring the reasons as to why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not be issued directing the appellants herein, the State of Rajasthan, the Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur and the Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur to forbear from giving effect to the impugned notification dated February 8, 1984 and passed an ad interim ex parte prohibitory order, restraining them from taking any steps requiring the respondents under sub-s. (5) of S. 52 of the Act to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith or upon their failure to do so to take immediate steps under sub-s. (6) thereof to secure such possession. We are distressed to find that the learned single Judge despite a long line of decisions of this Court starting from Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das (1984) 2 SCC 436 deprecating the practice prevalent in the High Court of passing such interlocutory orders for the mere asking, should have passed the impugned orders in the manner that he did. It seems that the pronouncements of this Court have had little effect on the learned single Judge.
(3.) The learned Attorney General appearing for the State of Rajasthan takes serious exception to the authority and jurisdiction of the learned single Judge to have entertained the writ petition filed by the respondents, and issued the rule nisi and to have made the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order which virtually has brought the entire acquisition proceedings pending at Jaipur in the State of Rajasthan to a standstill. He contends that the petition filed by the respondent purporting to be under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court and the rule nisi thereon and the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order secured by them on the basis of such petition from the learned single Judge on March 13, 1984 when there was total lack of inherent jurisdiction on the part of the Calcutta High Court to entertain such petition, constitutes a flagrant abuse of the process of the Court. There is, in our opinion, considerable force in this submission.