(1.) These three Writ Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India appear to us to be entirely misconceived. In Writ Petition No. 7982 of 1983 and Writ Petition No. 9874 of 1983, the respective petitioners are the BHEL Workers' Association, Hardwar and others and Bharat Heavy Electricals Karamchari Sangh, Ranipur, Hardwar. They allege that out of the 16,000 and odd workers working within the premises of the BHEL factory at Hardwar, as many as thousand workers are treated as 'contract labour' and placed under the control and at the mercy of contractors. Though they do the same work as the workers directly employed by the BHEL, they are not paid the same wages nor are their conditions of service the same. They allege that the management pays their salary to the contractors and in turn the contractors pay them their salary after deducting substantial commission. The wages received by them bear no comparison with the wages paid to those directly employed by the BHEL. They say that they work within the premises of the BHEL in different departments under the direct supervision and control of the Chargemen, Foremen and Engineers of the BHEL. Their working hours are as stipulated by the BHEL. They work on the machines of the BHEL and they are essentially part of the organisation involved in the production process of manufacture carried on by the BHEL. They are entitled to be declared as regular employees of the BHEL and further entitled to the same scales of pay as the workers of the BHEL. They allege that their rights under Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) are infringed. It is claimed that whenever a demand is made by them, they are thrown out of employment. They want a declaration from this Court that the system of contract labour is illegal, that they are direct employees of the BHEL and that they are entitled to equal pay as the workmen of the BHEL.
(2.) An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the BHEL by Shri P. C. Rao, Deputy General Manager, who while denying the Allegations made in the petition, has pointed out that if the petitioners had any genuine grievance, they should have availed themselves of the rights secured to them under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, Minimum Wages Act, Equal Remuneration Act, etc., for ventilating their grievances and seeking appropriate relief instead of rushing to this court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is pointed out in the counter-affidavit that certain jobs though required to be done within the plant area can be more conveniently and efficiently done on a job contract basis by contractors. This is particularly so in regard to the incorporation of new technology for expansion of production programme called the LSTG programme with foreign collaboration. The jobs themselves are entrusted to the contractors and it is not true to say that the contractors merely supply labour. They are required to do the total job and payment is made on the basis of the quantum of the work involved and not on the basis of the number of workers employed by the contractor. It is further pointed out that contract labour on the basis of job contracts is usually employed in connection with construction, erection and commissioning activities which are purely of a temporary nature, transportation including loading and unloading from wagons, trucks, trailers, tractors, etc. as well as internal transport, jungle clearance, weed removal and other horticultural activities. Work in connection with cleaning and upkeep of approach roads and plant areas and work relating to modernisation and rationalisation, such as shifting of equipment, etc. is also done on a job contract basis. These activities require varying number of workers at different times and it is considered, as a matter of policy, that the works are better done by job contractors than by the BHEL itself which has to concern itself primarily with the manufacture of turbines, etc.
(3.) It is clear from the allegations and counter-allegations that it is not possible for this Court in an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution to embark into an enquiry whether these thousand and odd workmen working in various capacities and engaged in multifarious activities do work identical with work done by the workmen directly employed by the BHEL and whether for that reason they should be treated not as contract labour but as direct employees of the BHEL There are other forums created under other statutes designed for deciding such and like questions. Perhaps realising the futility of asking us to compare the nature of the work done by those directly employed by the BHEL and those employed by contractors, the learned counsel chose to advance the extreme argument that the Court must declare a total ban on the employment of contract labour by public sector undertakings. It was argued that the employment of contract labour has been frowned upon by various committees appointed by the Government and Parliament itself thought that the employment of contract labour was undesirable and, therefore, enacted the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. It was submitted that in order to give effect to the intention of Parliament as well as the Directive Principles of State Policy, the Court should declare illegal the employment of contract labour by the State or by any public sector undertaking which for the purposes of Art. 12 of the Constitution is the State. In other words, the counsel wants this Court by its writ to abolish the employment of contract labour by the State and by all public sector undertakings. We are afraid that, that would be nothing but the exercise of legislative activity with which function the Court is not entrusted by the Constitution.