(1.) A single legal issue presents itself for solution in this appeal' The question is whether a public servant dismissed for misconduct is not ipso jure disbarred from employment under the State. If 'yes', the 1st respondent is ineligible for the public office of Chairmanship of Town Area Bugrasi from where he has been removed on the ground of dismissal from Government service, resulting in the eruption of this election dispute. If 'no', restoration to the lost office inevitably follows.
(2.) The. appellant and 1st respondent were rivals for Chairmanship of Town Area Bugrasi in U. P. The latter, a dismissed police constable, was returned by the electorate and the former, chagrined by the defeat, successfully petitioned the Election Tribunal. The Ground:
(3.) The appellant and the 1st respondent were two of the three candidates for Chairmanship of the Town Area of Bugrasi. The 1st respondent secured the highest number of votes and was declared elected by the Returning Officer. Thereupon the appellant moved the statutory tribunal by an election petition which was allowed on the score of disqualification for being chosen as Chairman by virtue of Section 6-K of the U. P. Town Areas Act (Act II of 1914). The disqualification stemmed from dismissal of the 1st respondent on September' 26, 1963 from the Delhi Police Force. When the Election Tribunal set aside the 1st respondent's election and declared the appellant as the Chairman, the unseated candidate invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Single Judge who heard the petition affirmed the order of the Tribunal substantially but in relation to the relief directed against the declaration of the appellant as Chairman, the order was vacated. That question was left to be decided afresh in the light of certain observations of the learned Judge. Dissatisfied by the result, both the appellant and the 1st respondent filed Writ Appeals before a Division Bench of' the High Court which ended in the allowance of the claim of the 1st respondent to be Chairman and consequential dismissal of the appeal of the other. The aggrieved appellant has, therefore, come up to this Court by special leave for relief based on the construction of two slightly ambiguous rules having some impact on this village election.