LAWS(SC)-1975-10-1

VIDYA SAGAR Vs. SUDESH KUMARI

Decided On October 08, 1975
VIDYA SAGAR Appellant
V/S
SUDESH KUMARI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is whether a decree for pre-emption obtained prior to the enforcement of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951) survives for execution after the enforcement of the Act in the particular area in which the land is situated.

(2.) Briefly the facts are as follows:- The plaintiff (appellant herein) and defendants 5 and 6 were co-sharers in proprietary interest of lands in Khata Khewat No. 1 of village Nayagaon Chandan Singh Bandobasti Pargana Bhabarkota, Tehsil Kaldhungi, District Nainital. Defendants 5 and 6 sold by registered sale deed a certain share of the land in that Khata Khewat in favour of defendants 1 to 4 (respondents herein). The plaintiff thereupon filed a suit for pre-emption and obtained a decree which was affirmed by the High Court in second appeal on April 27, 1970. The plaintiff also deposited the consideration of the sale deed in court on August 20, 1969, as ordered. The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (briefly the Act) was brought into force in the district Nainital where the property is situated with effect from July 1, 1970. The appellant instituted an execution proceeding after the enforcement of the Act in the area. An objection was taken by the judgment-debtors (respondents herein) under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, on various grounds including that with which we are now concerned, namely, that the decree has become inexecutable in view of the provisions of the Act. An objection was raised under Section 336 of the Act which provides for extinguishment of the right of pre-emption in the area to which the Act applies. The High Court repelled this objection and we are now not concerned with the said question in this appeal.

(3.) The only submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant before us is that the High Court is wrong in holding that the decree is inexecutable in view of Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act.