KRISHNAN Vs. KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY KURUKSHETRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) What appears to have been a clear case of refusal of admission to the appellant or the cancellation of his candidature at the proper time has been completely bungled and destroyed by the inherent inconsistency and seemingly contradictory stand taken by the respondent and lack of proper vigilance on the part of the Head of the Department of law. The facts of the present case lie within a very narrow compass and only two short points of law have been raised before us by Mr. Kapil Sibbal learned counsel for the appellant.

(2.) The appellant was a teacher in the Government High School, Dumarkha in the District of Jind (Haryana). The University of Kurukshetra was running law classes for three-years Course and had extended the facility to persons who were in service to attend the evening classes and complete the three-years course in that manner. The appellant decided to take the benefit of the facility given by the Kurukshetra University and joined the LL.B. Part I classes some time in the year 1971. According to the University statute a student of the Faculty of Law was given to option to clear certain subjects in which he may have failed at one of the examinations before completing the three years course. The students were to appear in six papers each year. In April, 1972 the petitioner appeared in the annual examination of Part I but failed in three subjects, namely, Legal Theory, Comparative Law and Constitutional Law of India. Subsequently he was promoted to Part II which he joined in the year 1972. Under the University Statute the appellant was to appear in Part II Examination in April 1973. On April 26, 1973 the appellant applied for his Roll Number to the University in order to reappear in the subjects in which he had failed and to clear them but he was refused permission and according to the appellant without any reason. The annual examination for Part II was to be held on May 19, 1973 and the appellant approached the University for granting him provisional permission to appear subject to his getting the permission from his employer to attend the Law Faculty. In between it appears that the appellant had been prosecuted for offences under Sections 376, 366 and 363, I.P.C. and was suspended during the period when the case was going on against him. The appellant was, however, acquitted and was reinstated by his employer on August 22, 1972. It would thus appear that on May 18, 1973 as also on April 25, 1973 when he had applied for his Roll Number to clear the subjects, the stigma of criminal case had been completely removed.

(3.) To start the thread, the appellant as mentioned already approached the University already approached the University on May 18, 1973 and wrote a letter to the University authorities giving an undertaking that if he was not able to get the requisite permission from his employer to join the Law Classes, he would abide by any order that the University may pass. It appears that on the basis of this undertaking he was allowed to appear at the Part II Examination on May 19, 1973. On June 20, 1973 the appellant wrote to the University authorities that the condition on which he was to get the permission was not at all necessary and that his results may now be announced. On June 26, 1973 the respondent informed the appellant that since his percentage was short in Part I his candidature stood cancelled. Thereafter there were series of correspondence between the appellant and the University authorities but the appellant was refused admission to LL.B. Part III Class. The appellant then filed an appeal to the Vice Chancellor of the University on September 26, 1973 which was also rejected on November 3, 1973. Thereafter the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the respondent cancelling the candidature of the appellant but the High Court after issuing notice to the other side and perusing the application form rejected the petition in limine. Hence this appeal by the appellant by special leave to this Court.