(1.) In a long line of decisions of this court the ambit of sec 33 industrial disputes Act, 1947, is now well-established. There is also no difference in principle of the law applicable to a case under sec. 10 industrial disputes Act and that under sec. 33. To put it clearly, it is this :
(2.) When an application under sec. 33 whether for approval or for permission is made to a tribunal it has initially a limited jurisdiction only to see whether a prima facie case is made out in respect of the misconduct charged. This is however, the position only when the domestic enquiry proceeding the order of dismissal is free from any defect, that is to say, free from the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice if on the other hand, there is violation of the principles of natural justice the tribunal will then give opportunity to the employer to produce evidence, if any, and also to the workman to rebut it if he so chooses.
(3.) There is a two-fold approach to the problem and if lost sight of , it may result in some confusion. Firstly, in a case where there is no defect in procedure in the course of a domestic enquiry into the charges for misconduct against an employee, the tribunal can interfere with an order of dismissal on one or other of the following conditions :-