RAIPUR MANUFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED Vs. OKHABHAI DEVRAJBHAI PATNI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal, by special leave, raises a short question of construction of certain provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows.

(2.) The appellant carries on business of manufacturing cloth in a textile mill situate in the city of Ahmedabad. The respondent was working as a jobber in the textile mill in the employment of the appellant and, according to the records of the appellants, he was due to superannuate on 7th January, 1971 on reaching the age of 60 years and intimation to that effect was accordingly given to him by the appellant by a notice dated 1st October, 1970 under Standing Order 19. It appears, however that the appellant decided to continue the respondent in service for a period of one year after the date of superannuation and the appellant accordingly gave a notice dated 24th September, 1970 under Standing Order 19-A continuing the service of the respondent for a period of one year and intimating to him that he would be retired on 8th January, 1972. Thereafter there was another extension of service granted by the appellant by a notice dated 12th January, 1972 issued under Standing Order 19-A and it was intimated to the respondent that he would be retired on 8th January, 1973. The respondent, by his letter dated 5th January, 1973, requested the appellant on compassionate grounds to grant him further extension of service for a period of two years from 8th January, 1973, but the appellant declined to do so and in the result the service of the respondent came to an end by retirement on 8th January, 1973. The respondent did not at any time until his retirement on 8th January, 1973 question the correctness of the records of the appellant showing that he had completed the age of 60 years on 7-1-1971. It was only after his retirement that the respondent for the first time, by his letter dated 13th February. 1973, gave notice to the appellant that his age was only 56 years on 8th January, 1973 and his retirement was, therefore, null and void and he should be reinstated in service. This was rightly regarded as a letter of approach by the respondent to the appellant under Section 42, sub-section (4) of the Act requesting for a change in respect of the order passed by the appellant under Standing Order 19 retiring the respondent. The appellant did not send any reply to this letter of approach and no agreement was arrived at between the appellant and the respondent within 15 days of the receipt of the letter of approach by the appellant. It appears that since there was no favourable response from the appellant, the respondent made an application to the Labour Commissioner on 17th March, 1973 requesting his intervention in the matter. The Labour Officer of the appellant appeared before the Labour Commissioner pursuant to the notice issued to the appellant and, to quote the words used by the respondent in his application before the Labour Court, "took adjournment for making compromise." But no compromise was arrived at between the parties and the respondent ultimately on 7th June, 1973 filed an application before the Labour Court under Section 79 (1) read with Section 78 (1) (A) (a) (i) of the Act praying that the order passed by the appellant retiring him from service should be treated as null and void and he should be reinstated in service with all benefits. The appellant resisted the application on various grounds and apart from disputing the claim of the respondent on merits, the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the application was barred by time under Section 79 (3) (a) of the Act since it was filed more than three months after the arising of the dispute. The respondent had also filed along with the application under Section 78 (1) (A) (a) (i) an application for condonation of delay and to this application, the answer given by the appellant was that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the application under Section 78 (1) (a) (i). The Labour Court took the view that the application of the respondent under Section 78 (1) (a) (i) was barred under Section 79 (3) (a) as it was not filed within three months, of the arising of the dispute and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the application and in this view, the Labour Court rejected the application without going into the merits. The respondent preferred an appeal to the Industrial Court, but the Industrial Court also took the same view and dismissed the appeal. The respondent thereupon preferred a petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and on this petition, the High Court reversed the view taken by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court and held that the application filed by the respondent under Section 78 (1) (A) (a) (i) was within three months of the arising of the dispute and hence it could not be said to be barred under Section 79 (3) (a). The High Court accordingly set aside the order passed by the Industrial Court and remanded the application to the Labour Court to dispose it of on merits. This decision of the High Court is impugned in the present appeal brought with special leave obtained from this Court.

(3.) The question which arises for determination in this appeal lies in a very narrow compass, but in order to appreciate it, it is necessary to refer to a few relevant sections of the Act. The first material section to which we must refer is Section 42, sub-section (4) which is in the following terms: