SUNDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is another appeal which comes before this Court on "Leave" granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad which does not fulfil the requirements of Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Only the other day this Court in the case of Baladin Lodhi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 181 V 43) (A) had occasion to draw the attention of that Court to the observation made in the reported case of Nar Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 457. It was observed by this Court that the grant of a certificate under Article 134 (1) (c) is not a matter of course but that the power has to be exercised after considering what difficult questions of law or principles were involved in the case which should require further consideration of this Court. If the case as decided by the High Court on the face of it did not involve any such questions, then apparently there was no justification for the High Court to certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to this Court. It was further observed that the word "certifies" in sub-article (1) (c) is a strong word which requires the High Court to look closely into the case to see if any special consideration arise. If a case does not involve any question of law, then however difficult the question of fact may be, that would not justify the grant of a certificate under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution, because if the High Court has any doubt about the facts of a Criminal case, the benefit of that doubt must go to the accused. If, on the other hand, the High Court has no doubt about the guilt of the accused and confirms the order of conviction passed by the trial Court, ordinarily there could be no ground for entertaining an application for a certificate that the case was a fit one for a further appeal to this Court. Where the High Court has reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to dealt or where it has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any Court subordinate to it and has convicted an accused person and sentenced him to death, those cases would be covered by the provisions respectively of Article 134 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution. Therefore, ordinarily in a case which does not involve a substantial question of law or principle in an affirming Judgment, the High Court would not be justified in granting a certificate under sub-article (c) of Article 134 (1) of the Constitution.

(2.) As will presently appear, the present case does not at all involve any question of law, far less any such question of unusual difficulty or importance. The conviction by the Courts below is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The only question before the High Court was whether the circumstances disclosed in the evidence do or do not unmistakably point to the conclusion that the accused was the guilty person. If the High Court had any doubt about the guilt of the accused or had any difficulty in accepting the evidence, its clear duty was to acquit. If, on the other hand, the High Court found, as it did find in the case in hand, that the evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused was clear, cogent and reliable, it had to dismiss the appeal. No further question of doubt or difficulty could arise thereafter. In our opinion therefore, the High Court's order which is the last sentence in the Judgment appealed from in these terms:"Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been asked for and is allowed" was erroneous. In the result, we must hold that the certificate, if it can be called one, granted by the High Court does not fulfil the requirements of Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution.

(3.) But that conclusion does not necessarily mean the end of the appeal. We have to consider whether in the circumstances of this case this Court could have thought fit to grant special leave in terms of Article 136 (1) of the Constitution. We therefore proceed to examine the case from that point of view.