(1.) This case has a chequered career. Initially, Title Suit No. 40 of 1927 was filed for partition of the plaint-schedule-properties by the mother of the appellant. Pending suit, a Receiver was appointed on 3/5/1933. During the course of the administration of the plaint-schedule-properties, he had inducted the respondents into possession purporting to be as tenants. Ultimately, the suit was decreed in January 1940 and the Receiver was discharged in December 1941. Thereafter, the appellant on attaining majority, filed a second partition suit Title Suit No. 53 of 1944, for partition of other properties and also the suit property which was jointly in possession and enjoyment of him and his co-sharers. He also filed an application for ad interim injunction to restrain the respondents from interfering with his possession when there was a threat of dispossession. On 30/4/1944, a preliminary decree in the Title Suit No. 53 of 1944 was passed followed by a final decree of 7/11/1949. Thereafter in November 1955, the third suit T. S. No. 164 of 1955, was filed against the defendants when the threat of dispossession to the extent of 2 acres and 21 cents was persisting for a declaration that the lands therein together with the garden and fruit-bearing trees belong to the appellant and his co-sharers and the respondents have no tenancy rights created by the Receiver and for perpetual injunction restraining them from interfering with their possession. The trial court dismissed the suit on 30/5/1959, in Title Appeal No. 773 of 1959, by judgment and decree dated 17/1 /1974.
(2.) The appellate court recorded the findings thus:
(3.) Feeling aggrieved against the appellate decree, the respondents filed Second Appeal No. 153 of 1975 in the High court. The learned Single Judge, by judgment and decree dated 16/8/1984, reversed the decree of the appellate court and confirmed the decree of the trial court. The High court held that the respondents remained in possession of the property and they have acquired by adverse possession the limited right of tenancy and that, therefore, the decree of the appellate court is not valid in law.