(1.) The appellant was one of the three who was tried by the Court of Session for offences punishable under Sections 302, 326 and 324 read with Section 34, I.P.C. for having caused the murder of one Dodda Thippaiah and injuries to P.Ws. 2 and 3. The trial Court convicted the appellant and his two co-accused for the offences charged and punished them suitably. The High Court on appeal took the view that Section 34, I.P.C. was not applicable because the occurrence had preceded with a verbal wrangle between the parties who were neighbours and that the genesis of the occurrence could not be known, it having sprung up suddenly. Therefore, on that analysis the High Court held each accused responsible for his own acts. The appellant, who alone is before us, was therefore, held guilty for offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C. because not only was he held responsible for the fatal injuries but other injuries too which were amongst the 16 injuries found on the deceased. The magnitude of the damage apparent on the dead body of the deceased was sufficient to repel the contention of the appellant that he had killed the deceased in the right of private defence when comparably the appellant and his (father) had just a few injuries, mostly simple except for a grievous one on the father. That apart it was manifestly clear that the incised wound inflicted on the deceased by the appellant with the aid of a dagger clearly indicated his intention to cause the murder of the deceased. Correspondingly the injuries on the person of the appellant were merely a pretext to carry forward the original design of causing death, though not commonly intentional, but individually entertained by the appellant. This Court, therefore, to begin with, had issued a limited notice to the State to consider whether the offence required any alteration, but on examining the matter in detail and in depth, we have come to the conclusion that the result arrived at by the High Court was correct, though its finding at certain places did leave the matter somewhat vague requiring probe.
(2.) For these reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. We accordingly dismiss it.