HARPAL KAUR CHAHAL Vs. DIRECTOR PUNJAB INSTRUCTIONS PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division bench of the High court of Punjab and Haryana in LPA No. 329 of 1977 dated 1/10/1980 reversing the judgment of the Single Judge made in CW No. 69 of1973 dated 2/8/1977. When applications were called for on 20/4/1968 for recruitment as Physical Training Instructors by the Subordinate Selection Board, the appellant had applied for the said post but on that date she had no qualification. In the meanwhile, the Board was abolished in September 1968 and the Selection Committee had considered those applications. The appellant was selected and appointed on 4/1/1971. It is the case of the appellant that as on that date she had acquired the qualification and she joined the post on 28/1/1971. The higher officers noted the illegality in the selection of the appellant and the Deputy Director by his proceedings dated 30/11/1972 directed the termination of the ad hoc appointment of the appellant. Then she challenged the termination in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge considered that the date of interview would be the relevant date for considering the qualifications since as on that date she acquired the qualification, the direction to terminate the appellant was held to be illegal. On appeal, the division bench reconsidered the matter and held that the last date of receipt of the applications, namely, 20/4/1968 being the relevant date to receive the applications, would be the relevant date to consider whether the appellant had requisite qualifications for consideration and appointment. Admittedly as on that date since the appellant had no qualification, the selection and appointment made of her was held to be illegal. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

(2.) It is contended for the appellant that since the appellant 'had been appointed by the duly constituted Departmental Selection Committee and as on the date of interview since the appellant had the qualification, her selection and appointment cannot be said to be illegal. We find no force in the contention. It is to be seen that when the recruitment is sought to be made, the last date has been fixed for receipt of the applications. Such of those candidates who possessed of all the qualifications as on that date alone are eligible to apply for and to be considered for recruitment according to rules. Since the appellant had not possessed the Physical Training Instructor qualifications as on that date, her illegal consideration by the Board and recommendation for appointment and the appointment made in furtherance thereof are illegal. Therefore, we cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel in that behalf.

(3.) It is next contended that along with the appellant two more candidates were selected and were appointed and their appointments were upheld by the high court. Denial to her is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We find no force in the contention. The view of the High court is obviously illegal and the judgment rendered would not form the ground for our holding that the others who got the benefit by illegal orders will be extended in favour of other candidates though illegally appointed. Article 14 cannot be extended to legalise the illegal orders though others had wrongly got the benefit of the orders. Under these circumstances, we find no ground to uphold the recruitment of the appellant as a Physical Training Instructor. However, the fact remains that from 28/1/1971 the appellant has been continuing in service even till date, "no doubt, by orders obtained from the court and pending litigation, we cannot give any specific direction as sought for to regularise her appointment. However, the dismissal of the appeal does not preclude the government to consider her case if they so choose. Therefore, it is open to the appellant to make a representation to the government to consider her case and the government to take a decision inthat behalf. We direct that the appellant's service may not be terminated for a period of three months from today and in the meanwhile, the appellant should apply to the government for consideration and her representation may be disposed of within that period. With the above observations, the appeal is dismissed.