(1.) The only point that is urged in this appeal relates to the third proviso to Section 36 (2 which was introduced into the central Excises and: Salt Act, 1944, by the central Excises and Sait and central Boards of Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1978. This Amendment Act also introduced Section 11a into the principal Act but Section IIA was brought into force only on 17/11/1980.
(2.) Section 36 (2 gives to the central government the power to call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which any decision or order has been passed under S. 35 or 35 (A) of the principal Act, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to its correctness, legality or propriety and to pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. The second proviso thereto states that "no proceedings shall be commenced under this Ss. in respect of any decision or order (whether such decision or order has been passed before or after the coming into force of this sub-section) after the expiration of a period of one year from the date of such decision or order". The third proviso to Section 36 (2 reads thus :
(3.) The time limit specified in Section 11a when there has been a short levy of excise duty, as is, admittedly, the case here, is six months. This is less than the period of one year provided by the second proviso to Section 36 (2. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that since Section 11a was not brought into force until 17/11/1980, the time limit for the purposes of a short levy notice under Section 36 (2 was not, until 17/11/1980, that provided by Section 11a and that, therefore, the notice with which we areconcerned in this appeal was not time-barred.