SHIVRAM ANAND SHIROOR Vs. RADHABAI SHANTRAM KOWSHIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant in this appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution was a member of the Armed Forces of the Union from August 1942 until August 17, 1970 when he retired from the Army. In 1964, he became the owner of a flat in a co-operative society in Tardeo Bombay having inherited the same from his brother. The respondent was already the tenant of the premises when the appellant inherited it as the owner. Soon after his retirement, the appellant filed a suit for ejectment against the respondent on the grounds of default in payment of rent bona fide personal requirement and unlawful subletting. This was in 1971. While the suit was still vending the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 was amended in 1975 by the introduction of Section 13-A-1. This was a special provision aimed at enabling a member of the Armed Forces of the Union or a retired member of the said Armed Forces to recover possession of premises, bona fide required by him for his occupation or the occupation of members of his family on the production of a certificate from the Head of the Service or the Commanding Officer. The certificate was to specify that the individual concerned was presently a member of the armed forces of the Union or that he was such a member and was now a retired ex-serviceman and that he did not possess any other suitable residence in the local area where he or any member of his family could reside. It was further provided that the certificate was to be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. An important distinction between the general provision contained in Section 13 (1) (g) and the special provision Section 13-A-1 is that under the special provision a tenant is disabled from taking advantage of Section 13 (2) which provides that no decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in Section 13 (1) (g) if the court is satisfied that having reward to all the circumstances of the case, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. The appellant, therefore, preferred to file a fresh suit for eviction of the respondent under Section 13A-1 of the Bombay Rent Act rather than pursue the suit filed in 1971. He filed a fresh suit under the new provision. He produced the certificate required to be produced under Section 13A-1. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority concurrently found that the Appellant bona fide required the flat for his own occupation and decreed the suit. The tenant moved the High Court of Bombay under Article 227 of the Constitution. A learned single Judge of the High Court, while not interfering with the concurrent finding of the subordinate tribunals that the landlord bona fide required the premises for his own occupation, nevertheless set aside the decree for eviction on the ground that Section 13A-1 did not enable a member or a retired member of the armed forces to seek the remedy provided by Section 13A-1 of the Bombay Rent Act if the premises were already in the occupation of the tenant when he became the landlord while being a member of the armed forces. The landlord has appealed under Art. 136 of the Constitution.

(2.) Section 13A-1 of the Bombay Rent Act is as follows:-

(3.) It is true, as pointed out by the learned single Judge, the Bombay Rent Act is a welfare legislation designed among other matters, to protect tenants from harassment and unreasonable eviction by landlords and it should, therefore be interpreted in a broad and liberal spirit so as to further and not to constrain the object of the Act. We also agree that the exclusionary provisions in the Act should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds. But this does not mean that the intention of the legislature expressed with sufficient vocabular clarity or gathered by reference to permissible sources may be by - passed to accommodate individual versions of what may appear reasonable. The task of all interpreters is to ascertain intention. It is often said, where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there can arise no question of construction. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. This is the true basis of the so-called golden rule of construction that "Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, - for in that case the words of the Statute speak the intention of the legislature". A court should give effect to plain words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the legislature. Bearing these general principles in mind, if we look at Section 13A-1 against the background and in the light of the object and the remaining provisions of the Act, what do we find As we said earlier one of the principal objects of the Act is to protect the tenant against unreasonable eviction by a landlord. So, the Act stipulates the grounds on which a landlord may seek eviction of a tenant. Section 13 (1) (g) in particular enables a landlord to recover posssession of any premises if the court is satisfied 'that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held ...........' So solicitous indeed is the legislature about protecting the tenant that Section 13 (2) contains a further stipulation that: