BINOD BIHARI MAHATO Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, who is an advocate practising in the courts in Dhanbad in the State of Bihar, has filed the present petition challenging the validity of an order of detention dated 18th March, 1974 made by the District Magistrate, Dhanbad under Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The case of the petitioner is that he is a prominent public figure in that District of Dhanbad and he has been Pramukh of Baliapur Anchal since the last about ten years and Vice-Chairman of Zila Parishad, Dhanbad since about four years. He has been associated with numerous social educational and political institutions in the District of Dhanbad and he is engaged in diverse activities calculated to bring about social and economic uplift of down-trodden people of Dhanbad District. The 16th Annual Convention of Bihar Rajya Panchayat Parishad was scheduled to be held at Gosaidih in Dhanbad District on 16th March, 1974 and the petitioner was the Chairman of the Reception Committee. The ruling party was very much concerned about the growing popularity of the petitioner with the backward classes, and therefore, with a view to undermining his position, the ruling party chose this particular time when the 16th Annual Convention of the Bihar Panchayat Parishad was shortly due to be held and got a false case instituted against the petitioner at P.S. Tundi. The petitioner was arrested at Dhanbad on 16th March, 1974 and after being produced before the sub-Divisional Magistrate, he was taken to Bhagalpur Central Jail from Dhanbad. On March 11, 1974 the petitioner made an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for being released on bail but no immediate order was passed on that application and the petitioner was, therefore, constrained to move the Sessions Judge for bail on 14th March, 1974. The Sessions Judge granted bail to the petitioner and on the bonds being verified and accepted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, an order dated 18th March, 1974 was passed for release of the petitioner. On the same day, that is 18th March, 1974, the district Magistrate, Dhanbad passed an order detaining the petitioner under Section 3 of the Act on the ground that it was necessary to do so with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The order of detention was in Hindi, which is the official language of the State of Bihar but there was also an English version of the order of detention. There was no material difference between the Hindi and English versions of the order of detention. Pursuant to the order of detention, the petitioner was arrested on 21 st March, 1974 as soon as he was released on bail in compliance with the order of release passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and at the time of his arrest the Hindi as well as English versions of the order of detention were served on him together with the grounds of detention which were also in Hindi and English version. The Hindi version, as translated in English, set out the following grounds of detention:

(2.) The first ground on which the validity of his detention was challenged on behalf of the petitioner was that the English version of the grounds of detention recited that the District Magistrate was satisfied that if the petitioner was allowed to remain at large he would indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or security of the State. This recital showed that the District Magistrate did not mind with any seriousness either to the acts alleged in the grounds of detention against the petitioner or to the question whether they fall within the purview of the expression "the maintenance of public order" or the security of the State" or both and that was sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. Now, there can be no doubt, in view of the decisions of this Court in Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1749 and Akshoy Konai v.State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 300 = (1974 Cri LJ 405) that if the order of detention purports to be based on the satisfaction of the detaining authority that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him form acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or security of the State, it would clearly be an invalid order. The satisfaction of the detaining authority in such a case would be on the disjunctive and not conjunctive grounds and that would mean that the detaining authority was not certain whether it had reached its subjective satisfaction as to the necessity of exercising the power of detention on the ground of danger to public order or danger to the security of the State. If the detaining authority felt that it was necessary to detain the petitioner on the ground that his activities affected or were likely to affect both public order and the security of the State, it would use the conjunctive 'and' and not the disjunctive 'or' in reciting its satisfaction. Where, however, the disjunctive 'or' is used instead of the conjunctive 'and' it would mean that the detaining authority was either not certain whether the alleged activities of the petitioner endangered public order or the security of the State, or it did not seriously apply its mind to the question whether such activities fell under one head or the other and merely reproduced mechanically the language of Section 3 (1) (a) (ii). When such equivocal language is used and the detenu is not told whether his alleged activities set out in the grounds of detention fell under one head or the other or both, it would be difficult for him to make an adequate representation against the order of detention. If, therefore, it appears in the present case that the order of detention made by the District Magistrate was based on the satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from carrying on activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or the security of the State, it would have to be struck down as invalid. But we do not find that there is any such infirmity in the order of detention. Whether we look at the Hindi version or the English version, the satisfaction which is recited in the order of detention and on which the order of detention is manifestly and avowedly based, is that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. There is no reference to the security of the State in the recital of the satisfaction contained in the order of detention. The District Magistrate was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner only on the ground that his activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and it was on the basis of this satisfaction that he made the order of detention. The Hindi version of the grounds of detention also reiterated the satisfaction of the District Magistrate based on the same ground, namely, that the petitioner, if allowed to remain at large, would indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The recital of the satisfaction in the Hindi version of the grounds of detention did not make any reference to danger to the security of the State by reason of the activities of the petitioner. It is only in the English version of the grounds of detention that we find the words "security of the State" added in the recital of the satisfaction of the District Magistrate. That is obviously the result of inadvertence and no argument can be founded upon it. In the first place, Hindi being the official language of the State, it is the Hindi version of the grounds of detention which must be regarded as authentic and the validity of the detention must be judged with reference to the Hindi version of the grounds of detention and not the English version. Secondly, even if we confine ourselves to the English version of the grounds of detention, it is clear that at the end of each of the grounds it is stated in so many words that the acts of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is no reference there to prejudice to the security of the State and it is only in the conclusion based on these acts that we find a recital of the satisfaction that if the petitioner is allowed to remain at large, he would indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or the security of the State. The words "or the security of the State" are obviously incongruous in the context. They do not fit in with the conclusion drawn at the end of each of the grounds which is confined only to the maintenance of public order and nothing more. There can be no doubt that these words have crept in the English version of the grounds of detention through some mistake. We cannot invalidate the order of detention on the basis of such an obvious error, ignoring the order of detention in both its Hindi and English versions, the Hindi version of the grounds of detention and the totality of the context so far as the English version is concerned.

(3.) The petitioner then contended that the first ground in so far as it alleged that the petitioner was propagating communal hatred between Adivasis and others (Biharis) and also between Adivasis and non-Adivasis was vague and unintelligible and the order of detention was on that account invalid. We do not see any force in this contention. Adivasis are the original inhabitants of the area while outsiders are those Biharis who have come from outside and who are, therefore, regarded as outsiders by the original inhabitants. The petitioner was, according to this allegation contained in the first ground, stirring hatred between these two groups of people. He was also propagating hatred between two other groups of people, namely, Adivasis on the one hand and non-Adivasis on the other. This allegation can hardly be regarded as vague and unintelligible. In fact the District Magistrate gave not less than five instances containing detailed and elaborate particulars and they were sufficiently informative so as to provide more than adequate opportunity to the petitioner to make an effective representation. This grounds must, therefore, be regarded as wholly unjustified and must be rejected.