STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. LEELA JAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A very short question regarding the proper construction of the proviso to S. 4(1) of the Rajasthan City Municipal Appeals (Regulation) Act, 1950, is involved in this appeal which comes before us by virtue of special leave granted by this Court.

(2.) The facts giving rise to this appeal are briefly these:The respondent Mrs. Leela Jain is the owner of a plot of land in the city of Jaipur. Under the relevant provisions of the City of Jaipur Municipal Act, 1943, she was required to submit to the Municipal Council plans for erecting constructions on her plot, obtain their approval and make the constructions in accordance with the sanctioned plans. She submitted her plans, which were sanctioned but it was stated that during the course of her constructions she made certain variations from the plan as approved by the Municipal authorities. A neighbour of hers, one D. D. Goswami alleged that the variations made by the respondent in carrying out the constructions of her house prejudicially affected him. On the basis of his representation the Municipal Council initiated an inquiry as a result whereof a report was submitted to it in which a finding was recorded that the respondent had effected variations from the sanctioned plan. The President of the Municipal Board considered the report and passed an order on September 19, 1956 directing the respondent to stop the unauthorised constructions immediately. It was stated that notwithstanding this order the respondent continued the constructions and completed them. When this was brought to the notice of the Municipal authorities, an order was passed that action be taken against her under S. 210 of the City of Jaipur Municipal Act, 1943. This section provides that where an owner or occupier was required to execute any work under the provisions of the Act and a default was made in the execution thereof, the Municipal Board might cause such work to be executed and the expenses incurred thereby to be recovered from the person in default. It is not very clear from the record what exactly was the work which the respondent was directed to carry out and which she failed to execute. The only thing that is necessary to be noticed is that there existed an order under S. 210 passed on September 26, 1956. Representations were made by the respondent to the President of the Municipal Council and thereupon, by an order dated October 24, 1956, the President ordered that the case against the respondent be compounded by her paying to the Municipal Council a sum of R. 101 as fine. It is stated that the respondent paid this fine, but the fact of her having done so is apparently a matter of some controversy to which it is not necessary to refer.

(3.) Shri D. D. Goswami, the respondent's neighbour, felt aggrieved by the order compounding the violation of the building bye-laws. No appeal was provided by the Jaipur Municipal Act from such an order, but he moved the State Government to set aside that order and the latter purporting to exercise jurisdiction under the proviso to S. 4 of the Rajasthan City Municipal Appeals (Regulation) Act, 1950 (to which we shall hereafter refer as the Act) set aside the order of the President of the Municipal Council. The respondent thereupon invoked the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash this order of the State Government. Though several contentions were raised by the respondent in support of her plea regarding the invalidity of the impugned order of the State Government, the learned Judges of the High Court confined their attention to one of the points raised that the order of the President of the Municipal Council which was final and not subject to appeal under the City of Jaipur Municipal Act was not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government under the proviso to S. 4(1) of the Act. The learned Judges of the High Court accepted this contention and acceded to the Writ Petition and passed an order as prayed for. The appellant-State having obtained special leave from this Court, has preferred this appeal.