LAWS(SC)-1964-3-57

D S CHELLAMMAL ANNI Vs. MASANAN SAMBAN

Decided On March 13, 1964
D.S.CHELLAMMAL ANNI Appellant
V/S
MASANAN SAMBAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Madras High Court. The appellant is a landlord in village Idaikkal, and the respondent is her tenant. The land in dispute was let by the appellant to the respondent and the rent was fixed partly in kind and partly in cash, the tenancy having been created sometimes before the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act No. XXIV of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Fair Rent Act) came into force. The agreement as to the payment of rent in kind was that the appellant would get 60 per cent of the gross produce, the remainder going to the respondent. The dispute out of which this appeal has risen arose in 1959 when the crop for that year was reaped. The respondent harvested the crop and brought it to the threshing floor of the appellant for division and claimed that the appellant was only entitled to 40 per cent of the crop as provided in the Fair Rent Act. The appellant's agent however demanded 60 per cent as provided in the agreement of tenancy. The dispute went on about for ten days while the harvested crop was lying in the threshing floor. Consequently, the respondent made an application to the Circle Inspector of Police complaining that the appellant was delaying the division of the produce and preventing the removal of the respondents share, and that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace. Thereupon the police made inquiry into the matter and reported to the Tehsildar that the harvested crop was lying in the threshing floor and the agent of the appellant was not prepared to divide the produce in accordance with the provisions of law and was insisting on the division being made according to the agreement. It was also reported that the crop was deteriorating and the seeds had begun to germinate as the crop was exposed to rain. Thereupon the Tehsildar directed the Revenue Inspector to look into the matter and measure the quantity of the produce and note the gross yield and report. The Revenue Inspector thereupon visited the spot on September 27, 1959 after issuing notice to the appellant's agent to be present at the spot for the purpose of measuring the quantity and determining the yield. The appellant's agent was however absent and the Revenue Inspector made measurements in the presence of the respondent and some prominent persons of the village in spite of the absence of the appellants agent. He then sent a report to the Tehsildar giving the result of his measurements. As however, the appellant's agent was not present, the crop could not be divided and the Revenue Inspector gave instructions to the respondent that the crop should not be removed. It appears however that the respondent removed the crop soon after the Revenue Inspector left. Thereafter the respondent sent a money order to the appellant for the amount representing the value of the appellant's share, namely, 40 per cent. It appear that soon after the appellant filed a criminal complaint of theft against the respondent and that was dismissed. Then followed the present petition under Section 3(4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. No. XXV of 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Protection Act) for the ejectment of the respondent before the Revenue Divisional Officer.

(2.) The Revenue Divisional Officer held that though the respondent was justified in insisting that the appellant should take only 40 per cent of the produce as provided by law he was not justified in removing the crop and that he should have proceeded to enforce his rights in the manner provided by law. As however the respondent had not chosen to proceed in that manner, the Revenue Divisional Officer ordered his ejectment refusing to exercise the discretion which lay in him to give time to the respondent to deposit the arrears of rent in court. The respondent then went in revision to the High Court. The High Court held that in the circumstances of the case, the Revenue Divisional Officer should have exercised his discretion in favour of the respondent. The High Court therefore set aside the order of ejectment in view of the fact that the rent had been deposited in the High Court. Thereupon the appellant applied for and obtained special leave to appeal from this Court, and that is however the matter has come up before us.

(3.) In the special leave petition the appellant raised the contention that the Fair Rent Act and the Protection Act were unconstitutional as they placed unreasonable restrictions on the appellant's fundamental rights to hold her property. But in the arguments before us, learned counsel for the appellant has abandoned the attack on the constitutionality of the two Acts and has only contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction under S. 6-B of the Protection Act to interfere with the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer.