DHIRUBHA DEVISINGH GOHIL Vs. STATE OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are appeals by leave granted by the High Court of Bombay under Article 133(l) (c) of the Constitution against its common judgment disposing of certain applications under Article 226. The short point involved in these appeals is whether the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is valid in law. The impugned Act, as its very name indicates, was for the purpose of abolishing taluqdari tenures in Bombay. Section 3 of the Act enacts that with effect from the date on which the Act was to come into force the taluqdari tenure wherever it prevailed shall be deemed to have been abolished. Under S. 5(1)(a) all taluqdari lands are and shall be liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and the rules made thereunder. Under S. 6, broadly stated, all the items of property which are comprised within the taluqdari and belong to the taluqdar vest in the Government as its property and all rights held by taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished. Section 7 provides for payment of compensation in respect of the property so vested and rights so extinguished. It also specifies the principles for and the manner of assessing and granting that compensation. Section 14 provides for compensation with reference to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act being payable in respect of any of the rights extinguished but not covered by the provisions of S. 7 or any other section of the Act. These broadly are the main features of the impugned Act relevant for the present purpose.

(2.) The attack on the validity of the Act with reference to these provisions is that the Act is expropriatory, that it is not for any public purpose and that the compensation which it provides is illusory. Now so far as the requirement of a public purpose is concerned it is too late in the day to maintain the contention that the abolition of the kind affected by the Act is not for a public purpose. The only serious argument, therefore, is as to the alleged illusory character of compensations provided by the Act. The Act, it may be noticed, was one passed by the Bombay Legislature in the year 1949. It received the assent of the Governor-General on the 18th January, 1950, and was gazetted on the 24th January, 1950. The attack in the High Court was accordingly based on the alleged violation of the provisions of S. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is as follows:

(3.) It was contended before the High Court that this was an Act in respect of which a certificate could have been obtained from the President under clause (6) of Article 31 of the Constitution in order to secure immunity from the challenge of unconstitutionality but since that has not been done, the liability to its challenge with reference to the alleged violation of S. 299 of the Government of India Act remains. The learned Judges of the High Court without going into the question whether or not under any of the provisions of the present Constitution this piece of challenge was immune from attack of the kind put. forward, dealt with the merits of the challenge and held that the Act was for a public purpose and that the compensation provided was neither illusory nor unfair and that accordingly there was no violation of the provision of S. 299 of the Government of India Act.