STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. RAO MANOHAR SINGHJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appeal filed on a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under Article 132(1) of the Constitution arises from the Judgment and order of the said High Court (Wanchoo C. J. and Bapna J.) in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, whereby the High Court held that Section 8-A inserted in Rajasthan Ordinance No. 27 of 1948 by Section 4 of Rajasthan Ordinance No. 10 of 1949, and the amendment to Section 8-A by Section 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance 15 of 1949 are void under Article 14 of the Constitution and issued a writ restraining the State of Rajasthan from collecting rents from the tenants of lands comprising the Jagir of Bedla held by the respondent.

(2.) The respondent Rao Manohar Singhji is the owner of the Jagir of Bedla situated in the former State of Mewar, now included in the State of Rajasthan. The former State of Mewar was integrated in April 1948 to form what was known as the former United State of Rajasthan. In April and May 1949 the latter State was amalgamated with the former State of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur and the former Union of Matsya to form the present United State of Rajasthan. Three Ordinance No. 27 of 1948 and Nos. 10 and 15 of 1949 were issued by the former State of Rajasthan in connection with State of Jagirs. The management of the Jagirs including the Jagir of Bedla was assumed by the former State of Rajasthan in virtue of the powers under these Ordinances. After the final formation of State of Rajasthan in May 1949, the Ordinances remained in force in a part of the present area of Rajasthan with the result that while Jagirs in a part of area were managed by the State in that area, the Jagirs in the rest of the state were left untouched and remained with the Jagirdars.

(3.) On January 4, 1951, the respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution contending that the said Ordinances were 'ultra vires' the Constitution and that they became void under Article 13\(1) of the Constitution of India read with Articles 14 and 31. The respondent challenged the Ordinances firstly because they constitute an infringement of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and secondly because the Jagirdars only of the former State of Rajasthan which was formed in 1948 are prejudicially affected, while Jagirdars of the States which integrated later on are not at all affected (Paras 9, K and L) It was alleged that there was denial of equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws by reason of these Ordinances and further that the State had taken possession of the property of the respondent without providing for compensation. The reply of the State was that the Jagir was a State grant held at the pleasure of the Ruler and that it reverted to the Ruler on the death of the holder of the Jagir and was regranted to his successor after the Ruler had recognised the succession. The rights of the Jagirdars were non-heritable and non-transferable and the Jagirs could not be partitioned amongst the heirs of the Jagirdar. It was pleaded therefore that even if the State took possession of the Jagir, the Jagirdar was not entitled to compensation under Article 31(2). It was also alleged that the impugned Ordinances had merely the effect of transferring the management of the Jagirs to the Government and did not deprive the Jagirdars of their property and they were consequently not hit by Article 31(2). It was denied that there was any discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. The High Court held on the first question that the provisions of Ordinances Nos. 10 and 15 of 1949, are not void under Article 31(2) or 19(1)(f). On the second point they recorded the conclusion that Section 8-A which was introduced in Ordinance No. 27 of 1948 by Section 4 of Ordinance No. 10 of 1949 and the amendment to Section 8-A by Section 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance No. 15 of 1949 are void under Article 13(1) of the constitution read with Article 14. The High Court accordingly allowed the petition and prohibited the State from collecting rents from the tenants of the land comprising the Jagir of Bedla held by the respondent. This Judgment was given on December 11, 1951, but we understand that since then the State has passed Acts abolishing Jagirs throughout the State. The question however is of some importance to the respondent inasmuch as it affects his right of collecting the rents even though for a short period.