VISHWANT KUMAR Vs. MADAN LAL SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as "the Rent Act") was amended by Act No. 57 of 1988. The said Amending Act came into effect from 1-12-1988. Section 3(c) of the Amending Act provided that the provisions of the Rent Act will not apply to premises whose monthly rent exceeded Rs. 3500/-. The question which arises for determination in this civil appeal is - whether Section 3(c) as amended was applicable to standard rent application, which was pending before the Court on 1-12-1988 when the Amending Act came into force

(2.) On 7th May, 1976, an agreement was entered into between the appellant-tenant and the respondent-landlord, under which the appellant took on lease a shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 5000/- per month. On 11-4-1978, the appellant filed a petition for fixation of standard rent under Section 9 of the Rent Act. The contention of the appellant was that the standard rent should be fixed at Rs. 1350/- per month and that the rent agreed upon at Rs. 5000/- per month was excessive. On 23-3-1987, the respondent filed his written statement. The case was pending on 1-12-1988 when Section 3(c) was inserted by Amending Act 57 of 1988. On 27-5-2000, when the case was pending, the respondent moved an application under Section 151, C.P.C. before the Rent Controller seeking dismissal of standard rent application made by the tenant, in view of amended Section 3(c). By order dated 16-12-2000, the Rent Controller allowed the landlords application and consequently dismissed the standard rent application made by the tenant as incompetent and not maintainable. Being aggrieved, the appellant herein preferred appeal No. 9 of 2001 before the Tribunal which was dismissed. Aggrieved, the appellant herein preferred second appeal bearing S.A.O. No. 4 of 2001 in the High Court which was also dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 4-5-2001. Hence, this Civil Appeal.

(3.) Mr. V. R. Reddy, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that Section 4 conferred a substantive right on the tenant not to pay rent in excess of the standard rent except to the extent of lawful increase of the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of the Act. On 11-4-1978, pursuant to the right conferred under the Rent Act, the appellant filed a standard rent application. It was urged that on 11-4-1978 the tenant had a right to apply for fixation of standard rent without limit. It was urged that when the lis commenced on 11-4-1978, all the rights of the appellant got crystallized. That the Rent Act was a beneficent legislation and the Amendment Act while inserting Section 3(c) did not intend to obliterate the rights vested in the appellant on the date of his petition for fixation of standard rent. It was vehemently urged that the appellant cannot be made to suffer because of Courts delay. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the doctrine of "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" . It was further contended that the right not to pay rent in excess of the standard rent did not depend on its fixation by the Rent Controller, that it was on incident of tenure and consequently it was not in the nature of protective right. In this connection, it was submitted that limited repeal in Section 3(c) did not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired under any enactment and, therefore, such a right was not intended to be taken away by Section 3(c) of the Rent Act. In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon several judgments of this Court.