(1.) This plaintiff's appeal, by grant of special leave, directed against judgment of the Madras High court, arising out of the suit filed for recovery of balance amount towards payment for the value of stock transferred in favour of defendant after he executed a deed of release relinquishing all his rights and interest in the firm in which he was a partner with plaintiff raises a very short question if the finding recorded by the division bench suffers from any error of law or is violative of substantial justice.
(2.) That the plaintiff and defendant were partners in a firm known as Traders and Traders, from which the defendant retired was not in dispute. Nor there was any dispute that some stock of the firm was transferred on settlement in favour of the defendant for which he was to make payment. The controversy centred round if the settlement arrived was superseded subsequently. The settlement deed was Exbt. D-2. The release deed executed subsequently was Exbt. P-22. And Exbt. P-24 was a paper signed by the defendant which purported to cancel all release deeds including the settlement deed Exbt. D-2. The claim of the appellant was that the respondent who had made only part payment in lieu of settlement and assured for paying the balance in short time failed to keep his promise. The learned Single Judge decreed the suit. But it was dismissed by the division bench. It decided the question posed by it whether the respondent took delivery of the stocks only as part of the implementation of the relevant clauses in Exbt. D-2, the settlement deed, or whether the settlement deed was superseded and the goods were delivered only in pursuance of release deed executed subsequently by answering it in favour of the respondent and holding that even if Exbt. P-22 was relied on it could not be taken to have superseded exbt. D-2 which had been given effect to. The bench did not find any good reason to rely on Exbt. P-24.
(3.) We have heard the learned counsel for appellant at length. His main effort has been to demolish the finding of fact recorded by the division bench by taking us through these documents. We find no merit in it. A finding based on appreciation of evidence is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered. Even assuming that two views were possible on construction of documents that would not justify interference in Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is not every error or mistake committed by the High court, which under the constitutional scheme is contemplated as the final court of appeal, to be corrected by this court in exercise of the power under Article 136 of the Constitution. Even the learned counsel had to agree that no question of law in the sense of it being of general importance or substantial in nature arises yet he urged that since the facts established that the plaintiff had suffered substantial injustice this court could interfere. It is difficult to agree with this argument. In our opinion, no case of injustice has been made out. Therefore, it is not a fit case in which this court is called upon to exercise its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution.