DHARAMPAL Vs. RAMSHRI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The admitted facts in the present case are as follows. The suit property consists of house No. 336 of village Khonda, District Mathura. The dispute with regard to the possession of the property arose between the appellants and the respondent-Ramshri. She filed an application under Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code [Code] before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadabad in which she claimed ownership of the suit property. On 31st May, 1976, the learned Magistrate passed a preliminary order under Section 145 of the Code and thereafter on 22nd April, 1977 made an order of attachment under Section 146 directing that the attachment would continue till the competent Civil Court determined the rights of the parties with regard to the said property. Against this order, a Revision being Cr. Revision No. 27 / 1977 was filed by the Appellants before the Sessions Judge who by his interim order dated 23rd April, 1977 stayed operation of the learned Magistrate's order. However, before the interim stay order could be communicated, the attachment had already been effected. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, again, by another interim order dated 26th April, 1977 directed the police to restore the possession of the property to the appellants from whom allegedly the possession of the property was taken the possession was restored to the appellants on 28th April, 1977. The said Revision application was dismissed on 18th August, 1977. Though, on account of the dismissal of the Revision, the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate revived, the learned Magistrate passed a fresh order dated 31 st January, 1978 under Section 146 attaching the property in dispute. Against the said order, once more a revision being Cr.R. No. 19/1978 was preferred by the appellants to the Sessions Judge who on 2nd February, 1978 passed an order staying the fresh order of attachment passed by the Magistrate.

(2.) Thereafter, the appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction against the 1st respondent and her husband, and in that claimed an interim injunction against them. The trial Court dismissed the application for interim injunction. Against the order of dismissal, the appellant filed an appeal to the District Court, and the Appellate Court by its order dated l8th May, 1978, allowed the appeal and issued an interim injunction against 1st respondent and her husband. Thereafter Criminal Revision No. 19/1978 preferred by the appellant before the Sessions Judge was dismissed on 15th June, 1978 also on the ground that the civil suit was preferred by the appellant. Again, although the order of attachment stood revived and the order of interim injunction by the Civil Court still continued, the Magistrate on 25th July, 1978 passed another order attaching the property. Against this third order of attachment passed by the Magistrate, a revision was filed by the appellants before the Sessions Judge and the Sessions Judge by his order dated 26th July, 1978 stayed the order of attachment issued on 25th July, 1978, up to 10th August, 1978. On 26th July, 1978, the appellant filed an application before the Magistrate for withdrawal of attachment on the ground that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace, On this application, on 17th October, 1978, the Magistrate ordered withdrawal of attachment. Against this order, the 1st respondent filed revision being Cr. R. No. 180/ 78 before the Sessions Judge who dismissed the same on 14th May, 1979. Respondent No. 1 thereafter, preferred an application under S. 482 of the Code before the High Court for quashing the order withdrawing the attachment and directing the attachment to continue. The High Court by the impugned order took the view that it was not open to the learned Magistrate to withdraw the attachment till the competent Court had decided the matter finally and restored the attachment.

(3.) On these facts, two questions arise in this appeal viz. whether the High Court could entertain the second revision application in exercise of its inherent powers under S. 482 of the Code and whether the interpretation placed by the High Court on the provisions of Ss. 145 and 146 of the Code is correct.