LAWS(SC)-1993-9-62

BHUWNESHWAR SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

Decided On September 01, 1993
BHUWNESHWAR SINGH Appellant
V/S
UNION OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in FMAT No. 3636/91 decided on 1st April 1992.

(2.) Pursuant to his trial by the District Court Martial, on various charges, the appellant, who was a sepoy in the Indian Army, was dismissed from service and also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four months. Through a writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta, he challenged his dismissal, conviction and sentence. In the writ petition, apart from disputing the factual foundation of the charges and the unsatisfactory nature of evidence to establish the same he also alleged violation of Rule 22 of the Army Rules; denial of his right to be represented by a Defending Officer at the DCM; defect in the promulgation of the findings and sentence, contrary to the mandate of Rule 71 of the Army Rules; the defect in the signing of the warrant for commitment to civil prison, by the officiating Commander instead of the Head of the Unit and violation of Rule 27 of the Army Rules read with Sections 101-103 of the Army Act as regards his pre-trial detention beyond the permissible period. Besides, the appellant also raised a plea that the period undergone by him in custody, before the trial by DCM was required to be set off against the sentence imposed on him by virtue of the provisions of S. 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1974. All the contentions raised by the appellant were considered by the learned single Judge who rejected the same, except the grievance concerning his pre-trial detention beyond the period prescribed under Ss. 101-103 of the Army Act read with Rule 27 of the Army Rules. The learned single Judge found that the appellant had been detained beyond a period of three months, before the convening of the District Court Martial, without obtaining approval of the Central Government which rendered his detention beyond the period of three months illegal. The learned single Judge accordingly directed the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000/- by way of compensation to the appellant for his illegal detention of about one month, beyond the permissible period of three months. The appellant unsuccessfully pursued the matter by way of an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, which confirmed the findings recorded by the learned single Judge and dismissed the appeal.

(3.) The appellant has appeared in person before us and made his submissions in Hindi, not being familiar with the court language. We suggested to him that we could provide him the assistance of an advocate through the Legal Aid Board or request one of the advocates to appear for him, amicus curiae, without any financial burden on him, but the appellant did not want the assistance of any counsel and insisted on arguing the matter himself. Not being conversant with the procedure of the Court or the law, the appellant took time to argue on matters, which were strictly speaking not relevant AND in spite of our advising him to allow us to appoint a counsel for him, in his own interest, he remained adamant and therefore lot of judicial time, which could have been utilised for other work, was spent by us in trying to grasp his grievances, in which task, Mr. Reddy the learned Additional Solicitor General gave us his valuable assistance. Taking note of the increase in the number of cases in which the parties appear in person in this Court, we feel that a stage has now reached when this Court, on the administrative side, is required to consider the desirability of providing some procedure to scrutinise their petitions and screen the parties, appearing in person AND only such of the parties who are certified by an authority/committee as "competent" to assist the Court in person, may, with the leave of the Court, be permitted to argue in person. Those of the litigants, who are not so certified, or those to whom leave is not granted by the Court, should be referred to the Legal Aid and Advice Board or the "Supreme Court Senior Advocates Free Legal Aid Society", which is a voluntary body and offers assistance, in appropriate cases, irrespective of the financial position of the concerned litigant. Apart from providing proper assistance to the Court, the assistance by the lawyers would ultimately tend to be in the interest of the litigants themselves. It would also take care of preventing objectionable and unparliamentary language in the pleadings, which some of the parties in person permit themselves the liberty of indulging in, not being familiar with the court craft and the bounds of law within which the parties must formulate their pleadings in proper language. Such a course would advance public interest while safeguarding individual interest also. Our experience shows that every advocate - senior, not so senior and junior - whenever requested by the Court to offer assistance has responded positively and generously and therefore the interest of the party in person who would be represented by such a counsel would stand adequately protected. We say no more on this aspect at this stage.