PRAKASH CHAND SACHDEVA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Ingratitude of a son, compelled his father, the appellant, a retired Assistant Engineer aged 77 years to knock the doors of the Courts, both, civil and criminal, to enter into possession of his own house. As this by itself was not sufficient, the respondent son in the affidavit, filed in this Court, has accused his father of, 'abusing process of Court' on 'false and fabricated allegations'. He has even taken the plea that his father was Vying to overawe him' and instead of seeking partition of the property as it was ancestral and he was co-owner of it, he was harassing him.

(2.) Dispute arose about an independent portion in house No. G-39, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi. It was in occupation of a tenant who admittedly vacated in February 1992. The appellant claims to have occupied it, The claim is supported by a letter written by the tenant to the appellant on 14th April, 1992 to the following effect:

(3.) True, a suit or remedy in civil Court for possession or injunction normally prevents a person from invoking jurisdiction of the criminal Court as observed by this Court in Ram Sumer Purl Mahant v. State of U.P. AIR 1985 SC 472, 'particularly when possession is being examined by the civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. The normal rule is as stated by the Court in Puri's case (supra). But that was a suit based on title. And that could be decided by civil Court only. That ratio cannot apply where there is no dispute about title. When claim or title are not in dispute and the parties on their own showing are co-owners and there is no partition one cannot be permitted to act forcibly and unlawfully and ask the other to act in accordance with law. Where the dispute is not on the right to possession but on the question of possession the Magistrate is empowered to take cognisance under Section 145, Cr. P.C. Neither the High Court nor the Sub-Divisional Magistrate cared to ascertain if the respondent had any claim to lawfully prevent the appellant from entering into his own house. The proceedings under Section 107 are for public peace and tranquillity whereas under S. 145 relates to disputes regarding possession between parties concerning any land or waters or boundaries thereof. Therefore, dropping of proceedings under S. 107 could not furnish foundation for dropping the proceedings under S. 145. Nor the law laid down in puri's case (supra) could result in rejecting the application, filed under Section 145 of the Cr. P.C. There being no dispute of title between the appellant and respondent the only claim to be decided was if the appellant had been forcibly or wrongly dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the information was received by the Magistrate and the High Court instead of deciding this crucial aspect, failed to exercise its Jurisdiction as the appellant had sought the remedy in civil suit, without applying the mind if that decision was in any way helpful for dropping the proceedings. In law, therefore, the order passed by two Courts below cannot be maintained.