GAMMON INDIA LIMITED Vs. NIRANJAN DASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondent Shri Niranjan Dass was employed as a Senior Clerk by the appellant-company as per the appointment order contained in the letter dated April 10, 1962. The letter of appointment inter alia provided that the respondent may be posted anywhere in India or abroad as per the requirements of the company and it was signed by its Zonal Manager, Central Zone, Delhi. Respondent continued to serve in that capacity when on September 14, 1967, he was served with a notice terminating his services. The notice reads as under:

(2.) The Industrial Tribunal held that respondent was retrenched from service by the appellant and the pre-conditions for a valid retrenchment were not complied with and therefore the respondent was entitled to a declaration that he continues to be in service with all the benefits flowing from the said declaration. A learned single Judge of the High Court interfered with this award holding that the appellant-company had closed its Delhi office and therefore the termination of service was consequent upon the closure and even if it constitutes retrenchment, the case would be governed by Section 25-FFIF which does not prescribe, payment of compensation as a condition precedent to a valid termination of service by way of retrenchment. In the Letters Patent appeal at the, instance of the respondent, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge holding that it was not open to the learned single Judge to hold that it was a case of closure covered by Section 25-FFF because it was implicit in the reference that the case was one of retrenchment and the only question with the industrial Tribunal was called upon to decide was whether the retrenchment was unjustified or illegal. It is not necessary to examine the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court whether the assumption underlying an order of reference is unquestionable at the hearing of the reference. The question, however, is whether the learned single Judge, who interfered with the award of the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the case was one of closure covered by Sec. 25-FFF or the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that it is a case of retrenchment covered by Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. This point can be answered by mere reference to the, notice served by the appellant-company on the respondent intimating to him that his services will no more be required effective from October 14, 1967. The notice as a whole has been extracted hereinbefore. The notice recites that as a result of recession in the volume of work of the company, services of the respondent would no more be required by the company after October 14, 1967 and this notice may be treated as a statutory notice as contemplated by Section 25-F (a). There is not even a whisper in the notice that as the Delhi office is being closed down, the services of the respondent would not be required. An attempt was made while leading evidence before the Industrial Tribunal to show that the Zonal office at Delhi was closed on January 31, 1968 while the Central Zone office was closed somewhere in Oct., 1967 if by September, 1967, the appellant-company had resolved to close the office at Delhi to which the respondent was attached it is unthinkable that that aspect would not be recited in the notice. The necessity for termination of service of the respondent recited in the notice was recession in the work, handled by the company. Not even one word is stated in the notice that the office to which the respondent was attached was in the process of being closed down, so his services would no more be required. On a true construction of 'the notice, it would appear that the respondent had become surplus on account of reduction' in volume of work and that constitutes retrenchment even in the traditional sense of the term as interpreted. in Pipraich Sugar Mills; Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union (1956) SCR 872, though that view does not hold the , field in view of the recent decisions of this Court in State Bank of India, v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 3 SCR 160, Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court Orissa, (1977) 1 SCR 586, Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, (1980) 3 SCR 884, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukherjee, (1978) 1 SCR 591, Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCR 518 and L. Robert D'souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway, (1982) 3 SCR 251. The recitals and averments in the notice leave no room for doubt that the service of the respondent as terminated for the reason that on account of recession and reduction in the volume of work of the company, respondent has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2 (oo) which defines retrenchment and it is by now well settled that where the termination of service does not fall within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is then indisputably a case of retrenchment.

(3.) It is not disputed that the pre-requisite for a valid retrenchment as laid down in Section 25-F has not been complied with and therefore the retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void. Viewed from this angle the award of the Industrial Tribunal was correct and unassailable and the learned single Judge was in error in interfering with the same. Undoubtedly, the Division Bench of the High Court has set aside the order of the learned single Judge and restored the award for reasons of its own. However, for the reasons herein indicated, the decision of the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No, 25 of 1970 is upheld and confirmed and this appeal must therefore fail and accordingly it is dismissed.