D P MAHESHWARI Vs. DELHI ADMINISTRATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise, industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Art. 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction, by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.

(2.) Having sermonised this much, we may now proceed to state the facts which provoked the sermon. The appellant D. P. Maheshwari was an employee of Toshniwal Brothers Pvt. Ltd., when his services were terminated with effect from, 28th July, 1969. He raised an industrial dispute and on 3rd July, 1979 the Lt. Governor of Delhi referred the dispute for adjudication to the Additional Labour Court, Delhi under Sections 10 (1) (c) and 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The dispute referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, was, "Whether the termination of services of Shri D. P. Maheshwari is illegal and/or unjustified and if so to what relief is he entitled and what directions, are necessary in this respect - The Management straightway questioned the reference by filing Writ Petition No. 159 of 1972 in the Delhi High Court. The writ petition was dismissed on 22nd May,1972. Thereafter the management raised a preliminary contention before the Labour Court that D. P. Maheshwari was not a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the reference was therefore incompetent. The Labour Court tried the question whether D. P. Maheshwari was a workman as defined in Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act as a preliminary issue. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. After referring to the evidence of the employee's witnesses the Labour Court said. "Thus according to the evidence of the claimant's witnesses the claimant was employed mainly for clerical duties and he did discharge the same." The Labour Court then referred to the evidence of the witnesses examined by the management and said, "Thus the said evidence falls far short of proving that the claimant was in fact discharging mainly Administrative or supervisory duties." The Labour Court then proceeded to refer to the documents produced by the management and observed. "Thus the documents filed by the respondent do not go to show that the real nature of the duties discharged by the claimant was supervisory or administrative in nature". The Labour Court next referred to what it considered to be an admission on the part of the management who had classified all their employees into three separate classes A, B and C, Class-A described as 'Managerial; Class-B described as 'Supervisory' and Class-C described as 'Other Staff'. The name of D. P. Maheshwari was shown in Class-C. After reviewing the entire evidence the Labour Court finally recorded the following finding:

(3.) The management was dissatisfied with the decision of the Labour Court on the preliminary issue. So, they invoked the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. A learned single Judge of the High Court, by his judgment dated 12th. July, 1976 allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order of the Labour Court and the reference made by the Government. A Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the decision of the single Judge on 25th July, 1980. The matter is now before us at the instance of the workman who obtained special leave to appeal under Article 136 on 4th April, 1983. The services of the workman were terminated on 28th July, 1969. A year later the dispute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. Thirteen years thereafter the matter is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary question. In our view, further comment is needless.