ASHARAM M JAIN Vs. A T GUPTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Asharam M. Jain sought special leave of this court under Art. 136 of the Constitution to appeal against the order of the High Court of Maharashtra in Notice of Motion No. 859 of 1982. The petition for special leave to appeal ran to 84 pages and at the foot of the petition, it was stated "drawn and filed by B. P. Maheshwari and Co., Advocates for the petitioner". Asharam M. Jain filed an affidavit along with the special leave petition affirming that the statement of facts in paragraphs 1 to 67 in the petition for special leave to appeal were true to his knowledge and belief and based on the record of the lower court. In several paragraphs of the special leave petition, Asharam M. Jain indulged in wild and vicious diatribe against the then Chief Justice of the High Court of Maharashtra. To illustrate the limits of the invective, we wish to refer to but one paragraph of the petition. In paragraph 26 of the petition, it was stated by Asharam M. Jain,

(2.) When the matter was taken up for hearing on August 22, 1982, Shri R. K. Garg placed before us an affidavit, said to contain the sincere and unconditional apology of Asharam M. Jain and stated that the contemner was placing himself at the mercy of the court. He submitted that the court should be so gracious as to accept the unqualified apology tendered by the contemner and refrain from sending the contemner to prison. He invited our attention to In Re:Shri S. Mulgaokar (1978) 3 SCR 162 where Krishna Iyer, J. suggested that 'a normative guideline for the judges to observe in this jurisdiction' was "not to be hypersensitive where distortions and criticism overstep the limits but to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude".

(3.) There is never any risk of judicial hypersensitivity. The very nature of the judicial function makes judges sympathetic and responsive. Their very training blesses them with 'insensitivity', as opposed to hypersensitivity. Judges are always seeking good reasons to explain wrong conduct. They know there are always two sides to a coin. They neither give nor take offence because they deal with persons and situations impersonally, though with understanding. Judges more than others realise the foibles, the frustrations, the undercurrents and the tensions of litigants and litigation. But, as elsewhere, lines have to be drawn. The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration of justice by vilification of judges. It is not that judges need be protected; judges may well take care of themselves. It is the right and interest of the public in the due administration of justice that has to be protected. We had occasion to point this out in Advocate General, Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries (1980) 2 SCR 1172, where we said: