SHIVAJI NARAYAN BACHHAV Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Special leave granted.

(2.) The appeal of the accused to the High Court was dismissed summarily with the one word 'diminished' placing this Court in a most embarrassing position in dealing with the special leave petition under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Such summary rejected of a peals by the High Court has been disapproved by this Court more than thirty years ago in Mushtaq Hussain v. State of Bombay (1953) SCR 809 (AIR 1953 SC 282) and thereafter over the years in a series of cases from the same High Court:Ramayya v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287. Vishwanath Shankar Baldar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 3 SCC 883, Siddanna Appa Rao v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1970 SC 977 Narayan Nathu Naik v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1971 SC 1656. Govinda Kadtuji Kadam v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 1033. Shaik Mohamed Ali v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 43, K. K. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 243. Jeewan Prakash v. State of Maharashtra. AIR SC 278. Mushtaq Ahmed v. State of Gujarat. AIR 1973 SC 1222. Krishna Vithu Suroshe v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 274. Sampat Tatyada Shinde v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1974 SC 791. Dagadu v. State of Maharashtra 1981 Cri LJ 724. We are pained and not a little perturbed, that despite the long series of judgments all arising from cases from the same High Court the High Court has not chosen to correct itself and continues in the error of its ways. Except in certain cases when an accused person has pleaded guilty and in petty cases every person convicted of an offence has a right of appeal under the Cr. P. C. An appeal may be both against conviction and sentence and on facts and law. A convicted person is entitled to ask an appellate Court to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion. An appellate Court has the undoubted power to dismiss an appeal in limine. Section 384. of the Cr. P. C. provides for it. But it is a power which must be exercised sparingly and with great circumspection. One would think a conviction for murder and a sentence of imprisonment for life as in the case before us, were serious enough matters for the High Court to warrant 'admission' of the appeal and fair and independent consideration of the evidence by the High Court. Summary rejection of the Appeal with the laconic expression 'dismissed' seems to be a drastic step in such cases. To so reject an appeal is to practically deny the right of appeal. We cannot also overemphasise the importance of the High Court making a peaking order when dismissing a Criminal Appeal in limine. "The requirement of recording reasons for summary dismissal however concise serves to ensure proper functioning of the judicial proess". There must be some indication that the High Court addressed itself to the questions at issue and had the record before it. In the present case there is not even an indication whether the record had been called for and whether it was before the Court. We have little option but to set aside the order of the High Court. The High Court may now 'admit' the appeal and deal with it according to law.