PYARALI K TEJANI Vs. MAHADEO RAMCHANDRA DANGE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A successful prosecution for a food offence ended in a conviction of the accused, followed by a flea-bite fine of Rupees 100/- Two criminal revisions ensued at the instance of the State and the Food Inspector separately since they were dissatisfied with the magisterial leniency. (Why two revision proceedings should have been instituted, involving duplication of cases and avoidable expenditure from the public exchequer is for the authorities to examine and inhibit in future). The High Court heard the accused against the conviction itself but upheld the guilt and enhanced the punishment to the statutory minimum of six months imprisonment and one thousand rupees fine. The aggrieved dealer has reached here through the twin routes of Art. 32 - a writ petition bristling with challenges of settled concepts and hanging every argument on the familiar peg of breach of fundamental rights - and of Art. 136 - a remedy to correct gross errors of law leading to the manifest injustice of loss of liberty for a long term of one who, the prosecution charged, jeopardised the lives of many consumers. The petitioner before us is the active partner of a firm, Gits Food Products (India), Poona, which, among other things, deals in scented supari. A sample of this stuff was purchased from the accused by the Food Inspector, Poona (P. W. 1) at a price of Rs. 24/- for 600 grams on January 25, 1971. A little diary of events will help unfold the rival contentions. The supari sample was duly analysed by the Public Analyst and his report dated February 12, 1971 revealed the offending presence of two artificial sweeteners, namely, saccharin and cyclamate. The Municipal Medical Officer of Health, Poona, granted the requisite statutory consent to prosecute and the very next day, February 26, 1971, a complaint was laid before the First Class Magistrate having jurisdiction. On the strenght of the prosecution evidence a charge was pramed on July 13, 1971, thus:

(2.) The accused's plea of innocence and supporting evidence not-withstanding, a conviction was recorded under S. 7 (1) read with S. 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act, for short), and on September 30, 1971 the accused was sentenced venially, for certain special reasons mentioned by the Magistrate, to a small fine. Revision applications were carried, as earlier stated, and the High Court while confirming the conviction, substituted a severer sentence, having no power to inflict less, in its view of the law. The appellant in this Court has, by way of second string to his exculpatory bow, challenged the vires of Rules 44 (g) and 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter called "the Rules"), and even of S. 23 (2) of the Act as being violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g). The reliefs claimed in both the writ petition and the criminal appeal converge towards the same end of getting an acquittal for the accused.

(3.) Before proceeding to a formulation of the points raised at the Bar and a discussion and decision thereon, two minor episodes deserve to be mentioned because counsel for the accused has built on them an argument for amelioration. As if to satisfy himself and to impress, by conduct, his innocence on the Court, the accused sent a sample of saccharin from the same tin from which the supari sold to the Food Inspector was sweetened. Ex. 22, dated March 1, 1971, shows that even before the filing of the criminal complaint the accused had requested for an analysis of a sample of saccharin sent by him on February 23, 1971, the result of the examination being that cyclamate was present in it. The further fact placed before the Court by the accused was that he had purchased saccharin in tins sold by the Standard Chemical and Pharmaceutical Co., Bombay, that these "Cycle" brand tins were stated to be of extra pure quality and the receptacles themselves contained a printed warranty like Ex. 31. The story of the accused is that it was such ultra pure quality of saccharin for which the manufacturer had given a warranty that found its way into the sweet supari he sold and that cyclamate was expressly declared to be absent therein by the manufacturer of the sweetener. His good faith was thus above board, according to the advocate for the appellant.