GIANI BAKSHISH SINGH Vs. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the appellant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 49l Cr. P. C for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for his production before the court and to be set at liberty. The appellant is a British citizen, employed in the Accounts Branch. Head Post Office. Birmingham and General Secretary of the United Kingdom Akali Dal. He came to India on 6-11-1972 to attend the Bhog ceremony of Sant Fateh Singh who died on 30th October, 1972. He was arrested on 16-11-1972 in pursuance of an order for his detention under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 3 read with Section 3 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. This order was approved by the State Government on 27-11-1972. The Advisory Board's report in respect of the detention was made on 4-1 -1973 and the State Government confirmed the order of detention on 16-1-1973 The grounds of detention were as follows:

(2.) Mr. Garg did not seek to argue nor could he argue that any of the grounds given for the appellant's detention were vague or irrelevant. It is now settled law that preventive detention is not a punishment for the past activities of a person but is intended to prevent the person detained from indulging in future in activities which may produce the results mentioned in Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. It is also well settled that the Court will not go into the truth or otherwise of the facts alleged as grounds of detention. The sufficiency of the grounds for detention is not also a matter which the court will go into. There can also be no doubt that the appellant's activities detailed in grounds (a) to (c) bring his case squarely within the ambit of subclauses (i) and (ii) of cl. (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.

(3.) The argument, however was advanced that in respect of a foreigner clause (a) of Section 3 (1) should be read along with clause (b) of that sub-section, and if so read an order of detention in respect of a foreigner can only be made with a view to regulate his continued presence in India and to making arrangements for his expulsion from India. It was, therefore, urged that as the appellant had made arrangements for his departure to England on 18-12-1972, his detention for purposes other than that of regulating his presence in India or making arrangements for his expulsion from India was illegal. It was also urged that even at this stage the appellant is anxious to go to England and that he would be satisfied if an order is made to take him under proper escort and put him on a plane leaving for England. We are not impressed with this argument. The power of a State to deal with foreigners committing offences inside its territory is not in dispute. The power of a State to detain even a foreigner who is found inside its territory in order to prevent him from indulging in prejudicial activities inside its territory cannot also be questioned. Mr. Garg did not seek to question the power of Parliament to legislate with regard to that subject. But he contended, however, that the power of Parliament in respect of preventive detention is found in Entry 9 of List 1, Schedule VII of the Constitution, and the power of the Parliament and the State Legislatures in entry 3 of the Concurrent list, that clause (b) of Section 3 (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act will not fall under either of those entries and that only clause (a) will fall within the ambit of that power and the power given by clause (b) can therefore be used only in aid of the power given by clause (a). We are unable to accept this contention either. Clause (a) and clause (b) deal with two different kinds of powers. Under clause (a) the power is given to the State to detain any person, including a foreigner for any of the purposes mentioned in that clause. Under clause (b) power is given to detain a foreigner either for regulating his continued presence in India or for making arrangements for his expulsion from India. It is within the competence of the detaining authority to exercise the power conferred on it under clause (a) or clause (b). In this case the order of detention is made under clause (a) and therefore clause (b) does not come into picture at all. We are not able to agree with the contention that clause (b) would be beyond the legislative competence of Parliament unless it is interpreted in the manner in which Mr. Garg wants it to be interpreted. It is well established that the various legislative entries should be interpreted in a broad manner and if any legislation could be brought within the ambit of any one or other of the legislative entries the validity of that legislation cannot be questioned. Entry 10, List I, Schedule VII: Foreign Affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country, would certainly cover clause (b). We may also refer to the Foreigners Act, 1946 which confers much more stringent powers in relation to a foreigner than clause (b). It has not been argued that those powers are not valid or that the Foreigners Act is not a valid piece of legislation. We may legitimately presume that the laws of various countries of the world confer similar powers on their respective Governments in relation to foreigners. In Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Supdt. Presidency Jail Calcutta (1955) 1 SCR 1284 = (AIR 1955 SC 367) this Court held that Section 3 (1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which is exactly similar to clause (b) of Section 3 (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, as well as Section 3 (2) (c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. on which it is based are not ultra vires of the Constitution. It was also held that Section 3 (1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act is reasonably related to the purpose of the Act, namely preventive detention, inasmuch as the right to expel a foreigner conferred by Section 3 (2) of the Foreigners Act on the Central Government and the right to make arrangements for expulsion include the right to make arrangements for preventing any breach or evasion of the order; and the Preventive Detention Act confers the power to use the means of preventive detention as one of the methods of achieving this end. This decision does not mean that Section 3 (1) (a) could not be used for the purposes for which it is plainly intended.