(1.) The plaintiff-appellant's allegations, in the suit which comes up by special leave before us, may be stated as follows.
(2.) The defendant's version was : The plaintiff, who was an Assistant Office Superintendent from 29-9-1948, was promoted to officiate as Office Superintendent with effect from 12-7-1948 in the scale of Rs. 360-500 with a clear stipulation that the promotion was subject to the plaintiff's selection subsequently and would not give him any claim to the post. It was admitted that the plaintiff was appointed to officiate as Assistant Office Superintendent from 21-1-1949, but, it was alleged that, during the period of 18 days for which he held this post upto 7-2-1 1949, and, even after that, the plaintiff had illegally utilised certain passes obtained under his signatures. A Selection Board, which met in 12-2-1949, for selection to the post of Office Superintendent , did not find the plaintiff to be the most suitable candidate. Hence, the plaintiff was reverted to the post of Assistant Office Superintendent from 14-2-1949. The plaintiff was again prompted to officiate as Office Superintendent with effect from 11-5-1949, but he was again reverted to his substantive post with effect from 1-7-1949 as a result of the charge sheet against him. The Railway administration had decided to appoint a second Selection Board after cancelling the appointment of the first one. The second Selection Board, which met on 11-11-1949, placed the appellant only second in order of merit so that the appellant had to continue as Assistant Office Superintendent. Hence, no question of his promotion as Office Superintendent arose. Furthermore, it was started that the post of the Office Superintendent itself was held in abeyance from 1-7-1949 but, another post of Assistant Office Superintendent was created in its place. It was, therefore, submitted that the plaintiff could never have held a post which was in abeyance. It was asserted that the plaintiff was given reasonable opportunity for showing cause against the action proposed to be taken again, him before his reversion, and that, after 1-7-1949, as a result of the representations made by the plaintiff, the General Manager gave the plaintiff a personal hearing and also appointed a Committee of three officers to examine the whole case of the plaintiff, including alleged withdrawal of the charges against him. The Committee reported to the General Manager that the remark made by the Deputy General Manager that no stigma was attached to the plaintiff was not justified. Nevertheless, the General Manager had directed payment of Rs. 40/- per month for the period from 1-7-1949 to 31-5-1951 for the extra work done by the plaintiff in addition to his duties as Assistant Office Superintendent. The jurisdiction of the Court to question the reversion from a merely officiating post was challenged. Furthermore, it was alleged that the plaintiff had knowledge of the dismissal of his appeal as he working in the office of the General Manager as Assistant Office Superintendent. The plea of limitation was also raised in defence.
(3.) The Trail Court, while dismissing the suit in toto and held that the suit was maintainable. This finding was upheld by the High Court on the plaintiff's appeal which was allowed only to the extent that Rs. 180/- was decreed as within time as the suit for the remaining arrears of salary was held barred by Article 102 of Limitation Act of 1908. The Trial Court had denied any declaration to the plaintiff, but the High Court had decreed the suit for declaration in the following terms: