KESORAM COTTON MILLS LIMITED Vs. GANGADHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are two appeals by special leave against the same award of the First Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal and will be dealt with together, Appeal No. 425 of 1962 is by the employers and appeal No. 426 of 1962 is by the workmen. The employers will be referred to as the appellant throughout this judgment while the workmen will be referred to as the respondents. There was a dispute between the appellant and the respondents with respect to two matters, which were referred to the tribunal for adjudication by the Government of West Bengal in the following terms:-

(2.) The genesis of the dispute as to the suspended workmen was this according to the case of the appellant. The workmen of the weaving department of the appellant commenced slow down from October 28, 1957, in spite of the warning given by the appellant. On November 3, 1957, doffers of carding refused to work on new machines. The workmen of loose godown and folding section started slow down from October 27, 1957 and November 4, 1957 respectively. On November 23, 1957, the workmen of the spinning department adopted slow down tactics and indulged in other subversive activities and left their respective machines in groups rendering the work in backward and forward processes idle. As a result of this conduct of the workmen for a period of about four weeks, the appellant had to lay-off a large number of workmen without compensation. Then on December 3, 1957, the workmen of dye house and printing department, went on an illegal stay-in-strike. In the first week of December, 1957, the workmen of blow room and carding went on strike. On December 9, the strike was commenced in the engineering department, cotton godown, bale godown canteen, high speed winding and old stores department. In the circumstances the appellant had to suspend 1600 workmen on charges of slowdown and various other charges. Thereafter negotiations were started between the union of the workmen and the management and an agreement was arrived at on December 23, 1957. The interpretation of some of the terms of the agreement is in dispute and we shall refer to them in due course. Suffice it to say here that by this agreement the workmen resumed work and undertook not to take recourse to go-slow activities either individually or jointly and not to take recourse to illegal methods and means for the achievement of their demands or for getting their grievances redressed. It was also agreed that maintenance of discipline was of paramount importance and the workmen as also the union at all times would co-operate with management in taking appropriate disciplinary action against the workmen for the maintenance of discipline in the factory. The agreement however provided that thirty workmen named in annexure 'A' thereof would remain suspended pending inquiry and disciplinary action by the appellant. The first term of reference with respect to suspended workmen is about the thirty workmen who were to remain suspended under the terms of the agreement of December 23, 1957.

(3.) The twelve workmen with which the second term of reference is concerned, were claimed by the appellant to have been guilty of various acts of misconduct for which they were liable to dismissal under the standing orders. They were duly charge-sheeted and inquiries were held against them and thereafter they were dismissed according to the provisions of law. As however the dismissals had taken place during the pendency of a dispute before the first industrial tribunal in which the appellant was a party, applications were made under S. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. No. 14 of 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for approval of the action taken by the appellant in regard to these twelve workmen. It seems, however, that before these applications could be disposed of, the dispute before the tribunal was decided, with the result that no orders were passed by the tribunals on these applications. The appellant, however, claimed that the dismissal of these workmen was justified and therefore no case for reinstatement or compensation arose. This claim of the appellant was disputed by the respondents and therefore we find this dispute being referred for adjudication in the second term of reference.