(1.) Mr. P., who is an Advocate-on-Record of this Court and who will hereafter be called the 'Advocate', acted for the Board of Trustees of the Dakhina Parswa Math of Puri through its Executive Officer respondent No.2 (b) in Civil Appeal No.232 of 1954. As such Advocate he entered appearance on November 9,1957. The said appeal was heard on the 2nd and 6th of May, 1958, and by the judgment pronounced by this Court on May 20, 1958, it was dismissed with costs in favour of respondent No.2(b). The Advocate had briefed Mr. J. as a senior Advocate to lead him at the hearing of the appeal. It appears that the client had paid the Advocate Rs.500/- on the eve of the hearing of the appeal and the senior Advocate was paid Rs. 1,000/- direct by the client. The Bill of Costs and vouchers had to be filed by the Advocate on behalf of his client within six weeks from the date of judgment under Order 40 Rule 12 of the Supreme Court Rules (hereinafter called the 'Rules'). The said period expired during the summer vacation of the Court. After the summer vacation, the Court reopened on August 4, 1958. Meanwhile, on May 20,1958 after the Judgment was delivered by this Court, the Advocate wrote to his client informing him about the result of the appeal and intimating to him that the bill of costs had to be filed. On June 28, 1958, he again wrote to his client and called for Rs.60/- to meet the necessary expenses in the matter of presenting the bill of costs. This amount was paid to him at Puri on July 26, 1958, and the Advocate passed a receipt in that behalf. He however, took no further action in the matter until about January 9,1959, when it appears that he inspected the Court records in order to be able to prepare a draft bill. A bill was accordingly prepared by him and it was presented in Court on May 19,1959. Since the bill was obviously filed beyond the period prescribed by Order 40 Rule 12, the office returned the bill to the Advocate. In ordinary course, the Advocate should have filed an application requesting that the delay made in filing the bill should be condoned., but he seems to have taken no further action in that behalf. Even so, on May 18, 1960, the Advocate asked for and received Rs.200/- from his client. It appears that Mr. Banamdar was the Executive Officer of respondent No.2(b) when the Advocate was engaged by him, but later, Mr. Misra succeeded to the office of the Executive Officer and the amount of Rs.200/- was paid to the Advocate by Mr. Misra; a receipt for this payment had also been passed it is difficult to understand why the Advocate asked for this amount. During this period the client wrote to the Advocate enquiring about the bill of costs but received no reply. When Mr. Misra realised that the Advocate was taking no action in the matter of presenting the bill of costs and obtaining orders thereon, he gave notice to the Advocate on January 9,1961, discharging him from his engagement. On the 12th January, 1961 he also applied to this Court to cancel the Advocate's Vakalat and to condone the delay made in the filing of the bill of costs. On March 12,1961, the Advocate agreed that his client can engage Mr. Verma. The applications made by the client for canceling the Advocate's Vakalat and for condoning the delay made in the filing of the bill of costs came up before the learned Judge in Chambers. They had, however, to be adjourned from time to time in order to enable the Advocate to appear before the learned Chamber Judge. Ultimately, on January 9, 1962, the learned Judge condoned the delay made in the presentation of the bill of costs without prejudice to the right of the judgment debtor to plead that the execution in respect of the bill of costs is barred by limitation. He also ordered that the papers should be submitted to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for taking action against the Advocate for the cross negligence shown by him in the conduct of the proceedings in this case. The Advocate was also directed to hand over all the papers of the case to Mr. Verma.
(2.) After the papers were thus placed before the learned Chief Justice, he constituted a Tribunal consisting of three members of the bar under Order IV-A Rule 18 to enquire into the conduct of the Advocate. The Tribunal then proceeded to hold an enquiry and submitted its report. The issue which the Tribunal tried in these proceedings was whether the Advocate acted with gross negligence in the matter of the taxation of the costs of his client in the appeal in question, and if so, whether such conduct amounts to professional or other misconduct within the meaning of that expression in Order IV of the Rules. The report of the Tribunal shows that it has found against the Advocate on both parts of the issue. In its opinion, the conduct of the Advocate amounts to professional misconduct as well as other misconduct within the meaning of the said Order.
(3.) On receipt of this Report, the proceedings have been placed before us for final disposal under Order IV-A, Rule 21 of the Rules; and the questions which fall for our decision are whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the conduct of the Advocate amounts to professional misconduct and other misconduct and if yes, what is the penalty which should be imposed on the Advocate