(1.) Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dtd. 6/8/2018 in Writ Petition (C) No. 9196 of 2015 by which the High Court has allowed the said writ petition preferred by the contesting respondents herein and has declared that the acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed by virtue of Sec. 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 2013 "), the Government of NCT of Delhi has preferred the present appeal.
(2.) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently submitted that it was the specific case on behalf of the appellant before the High Court that as the original writ petitioners before the High Court were the subsequent purchasers, they have no locus to challenge the acquisition / lapsing of acquisition. It is submitted that, however, despite the above objection, the High Court has entertained the writ petition at the instance of the subsequent purchasers and has declared that the acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed by virtue of Sec. 24(2) of the Act, 2013, relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Government (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Manav Dharam Trust and Anr., (2017) 6 SCC 751. It is submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 229, the decision in the case of Manav Dharam Trust and Anr. (supra) is not a good law. It is submitted that as observed and held by this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar & Anr. (supra) followed by this Court in the subsequent decisions in the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors., (2022) 8 SCC 771 and Delhi Administration Thr. Secretary, Land and Building Department & Ors. Vs. Pawan Kumar & Ors., (2022) 7 SCC 470, a subsequent purchaser has no locus to challenge the acquisition and / or lapsing of the acquisition. Making above submissions and relying upon the above decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.
(3.) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents - original writ petitioners is not in a position to dispute that they had purchased the land in question subsequent to the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Even, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners is not in a position to point out any valid title deed. From the averments in the petition before the High Court, it appears that the original writ petitioners claimed the relief based on general power of attorney, will, receipt etc., which as such cannot confer any title on the original writ petitioners.