SHIV MANGAL AHIRWAR Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard learned counsel for the parties.

(2.) This is a case where, on 15/3/2006, the present appellant, along with other co-accused, committed the murder of three persons. According to the case of the prosecution, the incident occurred at about 7 p.m. on 15/3/2006 at Village Khaira Kasar, PS Jujharnagar. It is alleged that the accused persons formed a wrongful assembly with the common object of murdering Rambabu, Dileep and Babbu. The accused were armed with deadly weapons, such as a countrymade pistol, lance, javelin, battle-axe, axe and sticks. Apart from killing three persons, they caused injuries to one Bhola and Smt. Shanti. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant for the offence under Sec. 302, read with Sec. 149 (on three counts) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'the IPC'). Three other coaccused were also convicted for the same offence. All the accused were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with a direction that their imprisonment shall continue for the rest of their lives. In the appeal preferred by the present appellant, the High Court has confirmed the sentence.

(3.) The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has challenged the conviction on merits by contending that the identification of the accused is doubtful. His submission is that as far as the appellant is concerned, there is no convincing evidence of his involvement in the offence. His other submission is that at the time of the commission of the offence, the age of the appellant was about 20 years, and on the date of the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court on 20/4/2010, his age was about 25 years. He submitted that the present age of the appellant is 38 years. He submitted that in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan & Ors.,2016 (7) SCC 1 the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction to direct that the appellant shall undergo imprisonment for the rest of his life. His submission is that such a power could have been exercised only by the Constitutional Courts when there was a question of commuting the death sentence.