GEETA DEVI Vs. DAULATI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question that arises for consideration in these appeals is : Whether a party the compromise decree can file a petition under 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 where parties a partition suit entered in a compromise and a decree was passed in terms thereof

(2.) It is not disputed that Ramadhikari Pandey was the original owner of the property in dispute. He had three sons Rupnarain Singh, Awadh Bihari and Brij Bihari, each having 1/3rd share. It is alleged that Rupnarain Singh transferred his share in favour of Brij Bihari. Subsequently Brij Bihari along with his sons mortgaged the property and as a result thereof they suffered a mortgage decree in the hand of Sohan Rai, mortgagee, and in execution case, half share of Brij Bihari and his sons in the house was sold by the Court which was purchased by one Daulati Devi. Subsequently, Daulati Devi filed a partition suit against Brij Bihari and his sons including Krishna Kumar Pandey carve out her share of 8 annas of disputed part of the house. It is accepted that in the said suit a compromise was arrived at between the parties and as a result thereof the compromise decree was passed. The terms of the said compromiseare as under:-

(3.) Krishna Kumar Pandey, who was a minor when the said consent decree was passed in the aforementioned partition suit also, preferred an appeal which was numbered as Title Appeal No. 161 of 1980. One of the questions involved in the appeal was as whether the father Brij Bihari could compromise the matter on behalf of his sons. The appellate Court recorded a finding that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor sons. However, the appellate Court modified the decree and remitted the matter the lower Court for ascertaining the valuation (marked value) of the suit holding 8 annas share on the date of filing application under4 of the Act before the lower Court. Against this order, the appellants preferred appeal before the High Court which was dismissed by order dated 20.9.1994 which is impugned in Civil Appeal No. 7129/1996.