LAWS(SC)-1992-2-67

STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. G SEENAPPA:D NAVINLAPPA:BHIMANA GOWDA SAHEB GOWDA BIRADAR:REVASINGH:SRI B SONNE GOWDA:AB NANJAWANGOWDA:M NARAYANAPPA:MUNEPPA:BAJANTRI MUNIVEHKATAPPA:SHAKUNTALA BAI AND ANOT

Decided On February 27, 1992
STATE OF KARNATAKA Appellant
V/S
G.SEENAPPA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Learned counsel for the petitioners, the State of Karnataka and others, has sought to challenge the correctness of the decision of a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Lakshmana Gowda v. State of Karnataka, (1981) 1 Kant LJ1 which has been followed by that High Court in the impugned judgments. As we are of the view that the judgment in Lakshmana Gowdas case deserves to be upheld, it is not necessary for us to set out the facts except the barest minimum necessary.

(2.) The Karnataka-Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (for short the 'said Act') came into effect from Feb. 1, 1963. It is common ground that under the said Act the lands given to the village officers were resumed and then re-granted to them. The re-grants were made at different periods. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the said Act placed a restriction on transfer of land regranted. It runs as follows :-

(3.) In our view, this interpretation placed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court on the provisions of sub-section (3) of S. 5 (before its amendment) appears to be a fair and just interpretation. The only condition laid down for the grant of previous sanction appears to be payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the land. There is no indication as to the principles on which the sanction was to be granted or refused and hence the interpretation placed by the Karnataka High Court that the only condition of sanction was the payment of an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of the land appears to be a just construction. That construction has stood for the last more than ten years and transactions must have been effected on the basis of the view of the law laid down by the Karnataka High Court. There is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair.