(1.) Equal pay for equal work, it is self-evident, is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14, it flows from it. Because clause (d) of Article 39 spoke of "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" it did not cease to be a part of Art.14. To say that the said rule having been stated as a directive principle of State policy is not enforceable in a Court of Law is to indulge a sophistry. Parts IV and III of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each other. They are complementary to each other. The rule is as much a part of Article 14 as it is of clause (1) of Art. 16. Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16(l) necessarily means and involves equal pay for equal work. It means equally that it is neither a mechanical rule nor does it mean geometrical equality. The concept of reasonable classification and all other rules evolved with respect to Articles 14 and 16(l) come into play wherever complaint of infraction of this rule falls for consideration. This is the principle affirmed in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 as well as in the subsequent decisions of this Court. It would be instructive to notice a few of them.
(2.) In Randhir Singh (supra), Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench of three learned Judges said:
(3.) The above principle was followed and applied in P. K. Ramachandra Iyer, (1984) 2 SCC 141 ; Savita, (1985) Suppl. SCC 94 ; Dhirendra Chamoli, (1986) 1 SCC 637; Surinder Singh, (1986) 1 SCC 639; Jaipal, (1988) 3 SCC 354 and in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91 . While it is not necessary to refer to all the decisions, a brief reference to the decision last mentioned may be in order. S. Mukherji, J. speaking for himself and R. S. Pathak, C.J. had this to say about the content of the rule: