KASTURCHAND Vs. RAMAN RAJAN ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) - The appellant Kasturchand challenges the judgment of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 158 of 1982 whereby the High Court confirmed the concurrent findings of the courts below. All the courts have held that the appellant is liable to be evicted from the premises on the ground of default in payment of rent.

(2.) The case of the respondent is that the premises had been let out by him to the appellant in May 1978 on a rent of Rs. 2,500/- per month. The appellant defaulted payment as a result of which the petition for eviction was lodged. The sole contention of the appellant in answer to the eviction petition was that he was not the tenant, but Dhanalakshmi Social Club was in fact the tenant. The eviction petition having not been brought against the real tenant, the appellant contended, it was unsustainable. He did not, however, raise any other contention.

(3.) The trial court accepted the contentions of the landlord and ordered eviction on the ground of default. The trial court found that the appellant Kasturchand was the tenant of the premises. All cheques in payment of rent were paid by him in his personal capacity. Receipts were issued to him, and the counterfoils of such receipts were duly signed by him in his personal capacity. At all material times, the parties understood the appellant as the tenant and the respondent as the landlord. This finding was confirmed by the appellate court. In the memorandum of appeal, a ground had been raised for the first time by the appellant to the effect that the plaintiff was not the owner of the building because he had parted with his ownership and possession in favour of his adult sons. Although this ground was raised, apparently no argument was urged, for there is no reference to it in the judgment, and no point was raised on it. This point was, however, urged in Revision before the High Court. The High Court found that at all material times, the parties treated each other as landlord and tenant. The appellant understood the respondent as the landlord. The respondent treated the appellant as the tenant. The documents evidencing the lease indicated that they understood each other as landlord and tenant.