LIYAKAT MIAN Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The four appellants in this appeal by special leave were committed to stand their trial in the Sessions Court for an offence under Section 395, I.P.C. for having committed a dacoity in the house of Hardeo Mahton in village Kursel, police station Hunterganj, District Hazaribagh in the State of Bihar. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh tried the case. Against Jashim Mian alias Sahajad Mian, appellant No. 2 in this Court (he was accused No. 2 in the trial Court) a new additional charge was framed by the trial Court under S. 307, I.P.C. for the offence of attempt to murder Burhan Mahaton. This appellant had during the course of dacoity fired a gun-shot at Burhan Mahton thereby causing him injuries on the abdomen and left arm. According to the trial Court had Burhan Mahton died with the gun-shot injuries then accused No. 2 would have been guilty of murder. On this view an additional charge under S. 307, I.P.C. was framed against the second accused. The dacoity in question had taken place on the night between 11th and 12th April, 1964. The trial Court held both the charges proved and convicted the four accused under S. 395, I.P.C. sentenceing each one of them to rigorous imprisonment for nine years. Accused No. 2 Jashim Mian was in addition convicted under S. 307, I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for nine years. Both the sentences in his case were directed to run concurrently. The High Court in appeal, after exhaustively considering the points raised before it, agreed with the conclusions of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal preferred by the four convicted persons.

(2.) Before us Shri Harbans Singh, appearing in support of the appeal, has streneously contended that the evidence on the record does not establish the guilt of the appellants. The elaborate arguments addressed by him when properly scrutinised merely suggest that the evidence on the record has been wrongly appraised and that the evidence of the eye-witnesses should have been discarded as unacceptable or should at least have been considered to be inconclusive and the possibility of reasonable doubt about the culpability of the appellants could not be excluded on proper appreciation of this evidence.

(3.) We do not think it is open to this Court on the fact and circumstances of this case to reappraise the evidence for itself in order to come to its independent conclusions, ignoring the conclusions of the two Courts below. As a normal rule this Court does not proceed to review the evidence in criminal appeals under Art. 136 of the Constitution, despite its apparent broad phraseology, unless there is some serious legal defect or a grave irregularity is committed by the Court below in reading the evidence and such illegality or irregularity has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Generally speaking, this Court is averse and discinclined to interfere under this Article except when the trial is vitiated by some illegality or irregularity of procedure or the trial has been held in violation of rules of natural justice. The defects in the trial or irregularity of procedure attracting this Court's power of interference under this Article may, inter alia, relate to misreading of evidence or pertain to illegal or erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, but such defects or errors must cause failure of justice. A mere technical defect or error of inconsequential nature does not call for interference. This reserve of power, though expressed in language of the widest magnitude, is essentially meant to be invoked only in exceptional cases when this Court feels that justice has failed as a result of the said defects or of unduly excessive hardship or wholly misplaced leniency. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any rigid test capable of covering all conceivable cases. The Constitution has left it to the judicial discretion of this Court depending on the soundness of its traditional sense of justice to determine in each case whether or not the interest of substantial justice demands interference. One thing is, however, clear : this Article does not confer an unrestricted right of appeal on any party to claim the reopening of all questions of fact and law where none exists otherwise.